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The arms embargo has deprived Bosnia-Hercegovina of
the right of legitimate self-defense. It has caused the
destruction of the country, deepened the war and caused
genocide. It has tied the hands of the attacked and helped
the aggressor. It has made the aggressor reluctant to...
compromise. Those who maintain the arms embargo are
accepting . . . the primacy of force in international
negotiations. President Izetbegovic, Republic of BosniaHercegovina.'
Madeleine Albright, the United States Ambassador to the
United Nations, warned . . . that the United States would
undermine international sanctions . . . if Congress
unilaterally lifted the arms embargo against Bosnia ....
Members of the Congress who favor lifting the arms
embargo unilaterally say Bosnia is an independent nation
entitled to self-defense under article 51 of the United
Nations charter until the Council has taken measures to
maintain peace.
But Albright said . . . the issue is one of politics, not of
law. 'The bottom line here is that this is not a legal issue,
it is a political issue . . . . If any one country decides to
act on its own and break down a multilateral arms
embargo, we then ruin that as a tool of the international
community.

'2

1. Entreaty to the European Community to lift the arms embargo. Boris Johnson and
George Jones, EC refuses to lift arms embargo 'Ending weapons ban would lead to more Bosnia
fighting,' DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 22, 1993.
2. Albright warns againstunilateralaction on Bosnia, REUTERS LTD. NoRTH AMERICAN
WIRE, May 2, 1994.
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This clash highlights the tension between the United Nations
Charter and the unilateral use of armed force by states. It poses a question
of obvious significance to international law, order and governance:
whether there might not be restrictions upon the Security Council within
the realm of its enforcement authority beyond which even it is powerless to
act.
Which advocate is correct? Is there an overriding legal regime
that precludes Security Council intervention, suspension and obstruction of
a state's efforts to engage in armed self-defense or can decisions curtailing
the exercise of that right be made and enforced on the basis of political
considerations? The answer is found in jus cogens, norms so fundamental
to international order that their operation can effectively trump even the
actions of the Security Council.
This paper will explore jus cogens and its relation to a state's
unilateral use of armed force, armed self-defense and the Security Council,
and will demonstrate the inability of the Security Council to preclude
armed self-defense. Discussion will address the following issues:
1) What is jus cogens?
2) What are the criteria for determining that a norm is jus cogens?
3) Is the use of armed force in interstate relations jus cogens?
4) What is the specific content of the peremptory norm governing the use
of armed force in interstate relations?
5) Is the United Nations Charter subject to jus cogens?
6) Is the United Nations Charter in derogation of jus cogens?
7) What is the relationship between a state's inherent right of selfdefense and Security Council action?
8) What are the implications for enforcement measures imposed by the
Security Council?
I.

What is Jus cogens?

Presently there is little dispute that there exist certain peremptory
norms within international law. The use of the term peremptory is to
classify these norms as ones from which no state can derogate. The
identification process has not arisen overnight. It has been evidenced by
over forty years of thought and debate within the relevant scholarly and
political communities.
A. The Scholars'Approach
Juristic efforts to classify certain rules or rights and duties on the
international level as inherent have, intermittently, affected interpretations
of treaties, and eminent opinions have been offered in support of the view
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that certain overriding principles of international law exist, thus forming a
body of jus cogens. However, it was not until the International Law
Commission (ILC) began its work on drafting a treaty on treaties that the
concept of jus cogens became the object of consistent attention.' In his
First Report to the ILC on the Law of Treaties, in his capacity as its
Rapporteur, H. Lauterpact proposed "A treaty, or any of its provisions, is
void if its performance involves an act which is illegal under international
law and if it is declared so to be by the International Court of Justice." 4 In
his view, the test for whether the object of the treaty was illegal and the
treaty void for that reason is, "inconsistency with such overriding
principles of international law which can be regarded as constituting
international public policy.", As reported in the 1953 ILC Yearbook:
[i]n his comment to draft article 15, Lauterpacht stated that
the incorporation of this article must be regarded as
essential in any codification of the law of treaties,
notwithstanding substantial practical and doctrinal
difficulties. That unlawfulness of the object of a treaty
implies the treaty's invalidity is generally - if not
universally - admitted by writers who have examined this
aspect of the validity of treaties.
Lauterpacht went on to say that the test of lawfulness and
validity of a treaty is not pure and simple inconsistency
with customary international law, because states may by
mutual treaties modify rules of customary law, but
inconsistency with those overriding principles of
international law which may be regarded as constituting
principles of international public policy .... 6

3.

IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 512-13 (1979) (citing

Lauterpacht, 27 B.Y. 397-98 (1950); and [19531 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 154-55, U.N. Doc.
AICN.416311953 especially 4; Fitzmaurice, 30 B.Y.30 (1953); 92 Hague Recueil II, 120, 122,
125 (1957)).
4.
Lauterpacht, [1953] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Conm'n 154-55, U'.N. Doc. AICN.4/6311953
reprinted in SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 208-09 (1984).
The International Law Commission (ILC) began work on the law of treaties in 1949. It was not,
however, until 1953, under the leadership of Lauterpacht as its second Rapporteur, that attention
was directed to jus cogens. LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PREREMPTORY NORMS (Jus cogens) IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 157 (1988).
5.

SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 209.

6.
Int'l L.
A/CN.4/63/1953.

Comm'n,

[19531

2

Y.B.

Int'l

L.

Comm'n

154-55,

U.N.

Doc.
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The third Rapporteur, Fitzmaurice, proposed the following as a
draft article in the Third Report on the Law of Treaties in 1958: "[i]t is
essential to the validity of a treaty that it should be in conformity with or
not contravene or that its execution should not involve an infraction of
those principles and rules of international law which are in the nature of
jus cogens." 7 In commentary, Fitzmaurice pointed out that the majority of
rules in international law are jus dispositivum. It is "only as regards rules
of international law having a kind of absolute and non-rejectable character
(which admit of no option) that the question of the illegality and invalidity
of a treaty inconsistent with them can arise." 8
In its work in 1963 and 1966 on the preparation of a treaty on
treaties, under the stewardship of its fourth Rapporteur, Waldock, the ILC
undertook in depth discussions of jus cogens. As reflected in the relevant
Yearbooks, there was agreement that there are rules of jus cogens in
contemporary international law. Peremptory norms were viewed as norms
from which states cannot contract out. 9 They are universal and express the
interest of the international community as a whole.'0
In his second report in 1963, Waldock proposed the following as
draft article 13: "a Treaty is contrary to international law and void if its
object or its execution involves the infringement on a general rule or
principle of international law having the character of jus cogens." He
offered the following definition of jus cogens. "[J]us cogens means a
peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is
permitted except upon a ground specifically sanctioned by general
international law, and which may be modified or annulled only by a
subsequent norm of general international law."" The commentary on the
proposal noted:
Imperfect though the international legal order may be the
view that in the last analysis there is no international public
order - no rule from which states cannot at their own free
will contract out - has become increasingly difficult to
sustain. The law of the Charter concerning the use of
force and the development, however tentative - of
international criminal law - presupposes the existence of
an international public order containing rules having the
7.
8.

SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 209; HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 158.
SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 209; HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 158.

9.

[19631 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 52, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1963.

10.

[1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 219-20, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1966.

11.

HANNIKAINEN,

supra note 4, at 158.
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character of jus cogens. The Commission will therefore, it
is believed, be fully justified in taking the position in the
present articles that there are certain rules and principles
from which states cannot derogate .... 12
In its 1966 discussions, the ILC, recognizing that such
peremptory, nonderogable norms exist, provided (in its draft article 50) the
following general definition: "[a] treaty is void if it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character."3
There was, additionally, virtual unanimity within the ILC
regarding the existence of rules permitting no derogation in international
law and that peremptory norms express the interest of the international
community as a whole.'4
Commentary in 1963 and 1966 touched on whether the emergence
of rules having the character of jus cogens was comparatively recent or
more long-standing. Several members opined that the concept of jus
cogens had originated in regard to such universal crimes as piracy and the
slave-trade as well as such principles as the freedom of the high seas and
other rules on the law of the sea.'"
The majority view was that jus cogens is a more recent innovation
brought about by the fact that certain aspects of interstate relations have
become of concern to all states, such as the formation of the League of
Nations and its pioneering effort to substitute some form of constitutional
government for the blind play of physical force into international
relations.' 6 Those espousing the majority view did not generally attempt to
prove that the notion was an innovation but, rather, referred to jus cogens

12. Id. The ILC did identify bilateral and regional treaty arrangements. Although there
was an exception suggested providing that the article would not be applied to a general
multilateral treaty which expressly abrogated or modified a rule having the character of jus
cogens, such was rejected at the Vienna Convention. The present Convention contains no such
exclusion or exception.
13.

[1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 247.

14. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 161 and note 9 (citing the comments of ILC members
Suy and Cadieux).

15. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 161-62 (reflecting the opinions of El Erian, Yasseen,
Castren and Ago). Rosenne thought that jus cogens had existed in international law for a long
time even if in inchoate form. Id.
16. This position is attributed to member Pal, in comments made during the 1963
discussions. Id. at 162.
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as an accepted fact. It was only the preparation of the Convention that had
rendered the notion a concern of the international community."
Despite the evident agreement within the ILC on the existence of
peremptory norms, it was agreed to leave the full content of the notion to
be worked out in state practice and the jurisprudence of international
tribunals.' 8 What the ILC did do was to provide "examples of the more
conspicuous instances of treaties that are void by reason of inconsistencies
with a jus cogens rule."' 9 That content cannot be worked out merely by
treaty. A treaty cannot impart the character of jus cogens to a norm, even
if the parties agree that there is to be no derogation therefrom. It is,
rather, the particular nature of the subject matter with which a treaty deals,
not the form of the provision, that gives a rule the character of jus
cogens.2
The final draft article, submitted for consideration to the state
representatives at the Vienna Conference, proposed: "A treaty is void if it
conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law from which
no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.",,
The View of the International
B. The Vienna Conference:
Community of States
The Conference turned its attention to draft article 50 in the 1968
22
session.
The ILC draft definition was lengthened and made more
specific.,3 The new article, now renumbered as 53, provides that:
17. Id.
18. Id. at 76 and 164-65. Although there was unanimous agreement on one norm, the use
of force, there was disagreement as to other norms that might be categorized as peremptory.
Consequently, it was determined that illustrations of jus cogens would be noted but that the field
would be left for subsequent development by states and courts.
19. See infra at 13-14.
20. [1966] Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 76, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1966. HANNIKAINEN,
supra note 4,at 163. There are a number of views on the manner in which a new or modified
norm emerges. Some commentators, such as Dinstein, although rejecting the notion of instant
custom, have noted that a multilateral treaty could modify jus cogens or demark the emergence of
a new norm if there was extensive recognition/acceptance to be bound to the treaty as a condition
of its entry into force.

YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE 104-06

(1994). Others, such as Sinclair suggest the logical impossibility of the idea that a treaty itself,
could create such a norm. SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 225-26. From this author's perspective, it
would seem inconsistent for a peremptory norm to be created by a multilateral treaty unless there

had been extensive antecedent acceptance accompanied by the opinion that derogation therefrom
was not permitted.
21.

SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 218.

22.

HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 166.
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A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts
with a peremptory norm of general international law. For
the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of states as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.24
The final text was arrived at in the 1968 session and was approved in a
final vote of eighty seven-eight-twelve in 1969.2
The consensus at the Conference fell into three primary groups. A
clear majority of states accepted that "there undeniably exist peremptory
norms" in international law. Consequently, a provision to this effect was
necessary.
However, it was felt that, at this stage of international
relations, it was not possible to arrive at a detailed definition of the notion,
nor was it the task of the Convention to do so. It was, nonetheless, held
that peremptory norms protect important interests of the international
community.2
A smaller group of states admitted the existence of peremptory
norms but expressed doubt regarding the imprecision of their
identification. Even though this group admitted that certain norms clearly
appeared to be peremptory, they questioned the adequacy of the criteria
available to separate jus dispositivum from jus cogens. This vagueness
might make misuses of the notion possible.27
Only a small group of western states were very critical of or
entirely opposed to the inclusion of provisions on peremptory norms in the
Convention.2 The clear upshot of this and the approval vote reflected that

23. Id.
24. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
25. United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties (UNCLT), Official Records,
Second Session (1969) at 106-07 [hereinafter UNCLT II]. The 1968 session, (UNCLT I) was
attended by 103 States; the 1969 session by 110. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 166. The
inclusion of the words at the time of its conclusion was voted on separately. It was adopted by a
vote of 43 to 27 to 12. Id. at 167. Although this seemingly stresses the non-retroactive character
of peremptory norms, the approval numbers are not overwhelming.
26.

HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 169.

27. Id. at 170-72.
28. France was among the most critical. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 17.
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nearly all state participants agreed that there are peremptory norms in
international law. 29

II.

What are the Criteria for Determining that a Norm is Jus
Cogens?

As article 53 makes clear, there are four criteria specified for the
identification of a peremptory norm:
1) status as a norm of general international law;
2) acceptance by the international community of states as a
whole;
3) immunity from derogation; and
4) modifiable only by a new norm having the same status?'
What does this first criteria status as a norm of general
international law mean? Although far from settled, it is useful to proceed
from the idea that norms of general international law are of general
applicability, that is they create obligations and/or rights for at least a great
majority of states or other subjects of international law.'
Debate is
engaged on whether the reach of such norms is universal in its
obligatoriness or whether a rule of general international law requires the
acceptance of nearly all as opposed to all states.32 Consequently, inclusion
of a norm as part of general international law, would imply that the
obligations it creates are accepted by the great majority of states, if not all
states. 1
Clarification of the universality component of general international
law, for jus cogens identification purposes, is provided in the second
criteria specified in the Convention: that the norm be accepted and
recognized by the international community of states as a whole. In
explaining the meaning of the phrase as a whole, Yasseen, the Chairman
of the Drafting Committee of the Vienna Convention had stated:
By inserting the words as a whole in article 50 the
Drafting Committee had wished to stress that there was no
question of requiring a rule to be accepted and recognized
as a peremptory norm by all states. It would be enough if
a very large majority did so; that would mean that, if one
29. Id. at 174.
30. Vienna Convention, supra note 25, at art. 53;
31.

HANNIKAINEN,

supra note 4, at 3.

HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 208.

32. According to Hannikainen,
HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 209.

33. Id.

there is quite a lot of support for this view.
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state in isolation refused to accept the peremptory
character of a rule, or if that state was supported by a very
small number of states, the acceptance and recognition of
the peremptory character of the rule by the international
34
community as a whole would not be affected.
Consequently, for a norm to be recognized by the international
community as a whole, it would suffice if all the essential components of
the international community recognize it. 3 A considerable majority of
those who have commented upon this have seemed to accept the views of
Yasseen. 36 Additionally, most agree that the lack of acceptance or even the
expression of opposition on the part of one or a few states is no obstacle to
37
a norm having peremptory status.
One apparent difference in effect between general international law
and customary international law is the inability of customary international
law to bind those states which persistently object, whereas under general
international law, if a norm has reached the necessary level of widespread
acceptance, its operation can not be avoided by objection or state veto;
non-recognizing states are bound nonetheless.
Obviously, no norm could realistically be considered a principle of
general international law if it did not, at a minimum, meet the criteria of
acceptance and adherence required for customary international law.
However, whether a norm has been denominated or identified as
customary international law should not frustrate, eliminate, or immunize
its categorization and recognition as a norm of an even more profound
nature, such as jus cogens. That inquiry requires assessment of the extent
of recognition and acceptance such as would cause its elevation to the
status of general international law, whereby it would bind even nonconsenting states.
Determining whether a norm rises to the level at which it binds not
only all states, but can not be changed by contract, disobeyed, or subject to
derogation, has one final step. It is the third criteria enunciated in the

34. UNCLT 1 1968, supra note 26, at 472. This remained the position of the ILC on the
term "international community of States as a whole." HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 211.
35.

Int'l L. Comm'n Report U.N. Doc. A/31/10, p. 287 and 251 (1976), cited in

HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 211.

It would appear that these comments were made in

connection with the ILC efforts towards a draft Convention on State Responsibility.
36. Id.
37. Id. The qualifier "accepted and recognized by the international community of states as
a whole art. 53. . .. [Aipparently . . . means by a 'very large majority' of states, even if over
dissent by a very small number of states." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

LAw at 102 rep. note 6 (1987) [hereinafter FRL].
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Vienna Convention, the non-derogable nature of what might otherwise be
a norm of custom, that is the dividing line separating principles of general
international law from those of jus cogens.11 Until a norm has attained
widespread recognition that it is not derogable, it remains a matter of jus
dispositivum.
In addition to setting forth these four criteria, there was an
underlying policy consideration stressed by several states similar to that
manifest in earlier ILC Commentaries. 9 This factor, a social criterion, not
articulated in the Convention itself, identified the purpose of peremptory
norms as protecting vital interests of the international community. This
concern expressed the view of the underlying rationale and place for such
norms in international global governance and world public order. 4
Hannikainen incorporates this concern as a fifth criteria to the
provisions of article 53 and suggests:
If a norm of general international law protects an
overriding interest or value of the international community
of states and if any derogation would jeopardize seriously
that interest or value, the peremptory character of the
norm may be presumed but only if the application of the
criteria of peremptory norms produces no noteworthy
negative evidence .
III. Is the Use of Armed Force in Interstate Relations Jus Cogens?
By the same measure of unanimity in which the very existence of
jus cogens was previously accepted by both the scholarly community
represented by the ILC and the political community consisting of the state
38. The inclusion of this norm in the United Nations Charter enhances its non-derogable
nature, as any action in contravention thereof, is a breach of a state's obligation under the
Charter. However, as jus cogens status is not created by treaty, the argument really rests on the
notion that what is incorporated in the Charter is the pre-existent norm, the universality and
acceptance of which is evidenced by inclusion in the Charter.
39.

HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 3-5, and 176.

40. Id. at 176. The Mexican delegate, for example, noted that rules of jus cogens are
derived from principles which the legal conscience of mankind deems absolutely essential to
coexistence in the international community at a given stage of the community's historical
development. Id. at 4 (citing U.N. Doc. A/CONF 39/11, p. 294).
A general overview of the writings of some scholars on the origins of the notion of jus
cogens from a natural law and positivist perspective can be found in SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at
201-09. Although some commentators analogize jus cogens proscriptions to municipal law
prohibitions on the unenforceability of contracts as contravening public policy, Sinclair is not too
sympathetic to this view. Id. at 205-06.
41. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 20 and 207.
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representatives at the Vienna Conference, there was accord that the use of
force constitutes the most conspicuous example of jus cogens.
A. The ILC Position
As early as his writings in 1953, H. Lauterpacht noted that there
had never been any waiver or change from that characterization of the use
of force and its status as jus cogens.4 2 By 1958, Fitzmaurice, the third
Special Rapporteur of the ILC, noted the prohibition of wars of aggression
43
as an example of a jus cogens rule.
Subsequent commentaries of the ILC clearly accord peremptory
status to the norm prohibiting the use of force, embodied in the United
Nations Charter, as expressing "not merely the obligations of Members of
the United Nations but the general rules of international law of today
concerning the use of force."
Illustratively, Waldock's 1963 draft article provided:
"In
particular, a treaty is contrary to international law and void if its object or
execution involves . . . the use or threat of force in contravention of the
principles of the Charter of the United Nations. . . . "' According to the
Commentary this "hardly needs explanation; the principles stated in the
Charter are generally accepted as expressing not merely the obligations of
Members of the United Nations but the general rules of international law
today concerning the use of force.""
The prohibition of the use of force noted by the ILC as a
conspicuous example of a rule of international law having the character of
jus cogens was, in fact, the only rule of jus cogens about which the ILC
was unanimous.41

42. Id. at 180.
43. [1958] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 27-28, and 40-41.
44. [1963] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 53. In what appears as an effort to separate the
dependence of its status as jus cogens from the use of force proscription contained in the United
Nations Charter, Hannikainen refers to such a prohibition as that concerning "the use of
(aggressive) force," rather than "reflected in article 2(4)" or even that "contained in the
Charter." See, e.g., HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 178 and 180.

45. [1963] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 52, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/Ser.A/1963.
46. Id. at 53.
47. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 163. Despite this unanimity, the ILC eventually
decided that no examples of jus cogens would be included in their draft. Rather such was to be
left to state practice and the decisions of international tribunals. Id. at 162 (citing the 1966 Int'l
L. Comm'n Report).
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B. State Criteria
Following the suggestion of the ILC to give primacy to states in
the determination of the particular norms of jus cogens, the state
representatives at the Vienna Conference reflected much support for the
prohibition of the use of force as an example of a peremptory norm." Of
the thirty-two states submitting examples of jus cogens, half declared that
the prohibition on the use of force was clearly of such character.4 9 Another
one fourth (eight states) listed this prohibition more generally as
peremptory because it constitutes part of the leading principles of the
United Nations Charter.?
The consensus of states on the criteria necessary for jus cogens
status is manifest in article 53 of the Convention. Clearly, under the
perameters set forth therein, the use of force meets those criteria.5' There
is almost no other norm of international relations more embedded in
practice and accepted as law nor with more widespread recognition as nonderogable than that concerning the use of force regime, long prohibiting
certain uses of armed force in international relations.12
As if further justification were necessary for according jus cogens
status to the use of force regime, it is beyond peradventure that the public
policy concerns underlying the notion of a jus cogens regime; the
protection of overriding interests of the international community of states
53
are manifest.
Additional confirmation that the use of armed force in derogation
of the norms reflected in the United Nations Charter, is considered by the
international community of states as a whole to violate jus cogens

48. Id. at 178.
49. Id. at 177.

50. Id. The final vote on the Vienna Convention was 79-1-9. There were eight states that
voted against the draft article on jus cogens (article 50). These were Belgium, France,
Switzerland, Australia, Turkey, Liechtenstein, Monaco, and Luxembourg. Among the states that
abstained were: Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Africa, and the United
Kingdom. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 181 and 174.

51. See id.at 9-12.
52. For an extended discussion of the extent, nature and scope of the use of force
prohibition, see id. at 18-30.
53. The fundamental connection of the norm to the United Nations regime, the aim of
which is to secure international pace and security, fulfills the fifth component of the jus cogens
criteria:
the protection of overriding interests of the international community of states.
HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 207.
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proscriptions is reflected in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States."
C. JudicialContribution
The other source of input denominated by the ILC is that of
international tribunals. Decisions of the International Court of Justice
increasingly reflect judicial acknowledgment that jus cogens exists and that
questions pertaining to the use of armed force are involved therein."' For
example, the Court's opinion in the Nicaragua case reflects majority
acceptance of the arguments of both the United States and Nicaragua that
there are certain underlying issues relating to the use of force that have the
character of jus cogens and notes:
The principle of the prohibition of the use of force
expressed in article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter of the
United Nations . . . is frequently referred to in statements
by state representatives as being not only a principle of
customary international law but also a fundamental or
cardinal principle of such law. The International Law
Commission, in the course of its work on the codification
of the law of treaties, expressed the view that 'the law of
the Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force
in itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule in
international law having the character of jus cogens.'
(citations omitted) (1966 version)."
Notice is given to jus cogens in the separate opinions of Judges Singh and
Setta-Camara as well. 5
54. FRL, supra note 38, at 102, cmt. h and k at 237-8 and rep. note 6 at 34. The United
States agreed to the inclusion of articles 53 and 64 in the Vienna Convention but has yet to ratify
the treaty. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 149.

55. United States federal courts have even recognized the applicability of jus cogens to
human rights violations such as torture, disappearances, and arbitrary detentions under the Alien
Tort Claim Act as violations of the laws of nations. Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26
F.3d 1166, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Comm. of United States Citizens in Nicaragua v. Reagan,
859 F.2d 929, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699,
715-17 (9th Cir. 1992).
56. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, at para. 190 (June 27).

57. Judge Singh underscored that "the principle of non-use of force belongs to the realm of
jus cogens." Id. at 153. Judge Sette-Camara expressed the firm view that the non-use of force
can be recognized as a peremptory rule. Id. at 199.
The Court approached the use of armed force as customary international law. To the extent
that the I.C.J. statute speaks to general principles of law as evidenced by custom, the substance of
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D. Scholar'sNote
Even a commentator as confessedly conservative in his
investigation and analysis of jus cogens as Sinclair, notes that, applying a
test for qualification of a particular rule as a norm of jus cogens by
reference to the evidence for its acceptance as such by the international
community as a whole, with the burden of proof resting on the party
alleging the jus cogens character of the rule:
It would seem that sufficient evidence for ascribing the
character of jus cogens to a rule of international law exists
in relation to the rule which requires states to refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any other state.
There is ample evidence for the
proposition that, subject to the necessary exceptions for the
use of force in self-defense or under the authority of a
competent organ of the United Nations or a regional
agency acting in accordance with the Charter, the use of
armed or physical force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state is now prohibited. This
proposition is so central to the existence of any
international legal order of individual nation states
(however nascent that legal order may be) that it must be
taken to have the character of jus cogens .
IV. What is the Specific Content of the Peremptory Norm
Governing the Use of Armed Force in Interstate Relations?
Peremptory norm status is not accorded to the use of armed force
merely because there are provisions relating thereto in the Charter. That
there is no necessary linkage between and dependence upon peremptory
status and inclusion in a treaty was clear in the debates at the Vienna
Conference? 9 The ILC has clearly set forth the proposition that a treaty in
the jus cogens and customary international law can, effectively, be the same. It is the nature of
the derogation that is the separating line. I.C.J. Statute, art. 38(1)(b) (1945).
The I.C.J. decision in Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. also speaks to the concept of
jus cogens in its references to obligations owed erga omnes (to the international community at
large) such as that derived from outlawing acts of aggression which all states have a legal interest
in protecting. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 5).
58. SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 222-23.
59. Of the thirty-two states offering the use of force as the prime example of jus cogens,
only eight ascribed that status to its inclusion as a fundamental principle of the Charter. None
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and of itself, without pre-existing state practice which it reflects, is
insufficient to create a peremptory norm." Further the commentaries of
the ILC do not restrict its understanding of the jus cogens character of the
use of force to that which was specifically codified in the Charter. Rather,
the comments reflect that the use of force regime is embedded therein, but
derives, its peremptory character from its identity as a general principle of
6

law .

Logic compels this conclusion because the Charter could not create
or modify a pre-existent peremptory norm without being in violation of the
existent norm unless, at a minimum, there was widespread, pre-existent
recognition of the new norm, confirmed, for example, by extensive state
practice, coupled with evidence that the treaty was written with the intent
to conform international treaty obligations to that new norm. 6 The
relevant Charter travaux clearly reflect the contrary.61
A. What is the Content of the Use of Armed Force Regime that Preexisted the Charter and Found Reflection Therein?
The norm prohibiting force in interstate relations, is widely
recognized as prohibiting the threat or use of armed force against the
territorial integrity and/or political independence of another state." This
prohibition is not limited to wars of aggression but also extends to the use
or threat of aggressive armed force.6 This normative regime is reflected in
seemed to specifically restrict and identify the content of this norm as reflected in the Charter
alone. See HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 15.

60. This result is the logical extension of the rule that would void any treaty that, at the
time of its creation, is in conflict with a pre-existent peremptory norm. See id. at 7, and note 21.
61. See generally [1953] Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n; [1966] Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n.
62. DINSTEIN, supra note 21, at 105-06 (rejecting the notion of instant custom and
highlighting that treaties effecting a modification of jus cogens could occur if, at the time of their
making the modifying treaty had gained the backing of the international community as a whole).
See also SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 225-26.
63. This is more thoroughly presented infra pp. 38-59, 61-63.
64. See generally Military and Paramilitary Acitivities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at para. 190 (June 27). See also infra pp. 18-25.
Use of the term aggression or aggressive use offorce will be used as a term of art to denote
the use of armed force in contravention of this general proscription. Just as the term force has
been subject to definitions that range from military to non-military coercion, both direct and
indirect, the almost fifty year effort, still not definitively resolved, to come to a specific definition
of aggression, renders its use here more confusing than clarifying. It is, perhaps, essential to
remember that at the UNCIO in 1945, the Charter drafters rejected any effort to insert a set
definition of aggression although such is featured in the authority of the Security Council. See 6
UNCIO (1945), discussions of Comm. 3, Comm. III.
65.

HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 327.
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article 2(4) of the Charter, in the charters of such regional organizations
and entities as the OAS, OAU, the Arab League, NATO, and the Warsaw
Pact, as well as various declarations of non-aligned countries and bilateral
treaties." The prevalence of its inclusion in these numerous instruments
emphasizes the universality of the prohibition, rather than marks its
creation. Further evidence of this universality was stressed in 1987 by the
United Nations General Assembly Declaration on the Enhancement of the
Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use in
International Law, which was adopted unanimously.61
As noted by Hannikainen, after an exhaustive review of jus cogens
as applied to the use of armed force, "[a]ll states are under the peremptory
obligation to refrain from the use or threat of aggressive armed force, i.e.,
armed force with an aggressive (including dictatorial) intention, against
another state ...."6

B.
What isthe Relationship Between the Prohibition on the Use of
Armed Force and a State's Right to Use Such Force in its defense?
Once there was general acceptance by states of limitations on their
recourse to armed force in what had, theretofore, been discretionary
policy, a use of force regime developed in which distinctions were made
whereby armed force was either justified or not; permissible or
66. Id. at 332.
67. Id. at 333. A number of UNGA Resolutions confirm the universality of the prohibition
on the use of aggressive force in interstate relations. These include the unanimous 1970
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations Among states
which interprets the principle of the prohibition of force as including the use or threat of force
and the 1974 definition of aggression, also approved by unanimity. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N.
GAOR, 25" Sess., Supp. No. 18, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1970). G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR,
29"' Sess., Supp. No. 19, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (1974).
68. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 356. His reference to aggressive intent appears as an
effort to separate out those uses of force, such as the rescue of nationals and humanitarian
intervention which have involved the use of force in the territory of another state undertaken in
seeming violation of 2(4) yet, without any aggressive intent. While such may implicate lesser
uses of force and debate rages as to whether this is unlawful under the Charter regime, such
milder forms of force do not implicate jus cogens concerns. Id. at 336-37, 340.
He notes: "[E]ssentially my conclusion concurs with the view of the ILC regarding the
content of the peremptory prohibition of the use of aggressive armed force." See Int'l L.
Comm'n Report 1980. U.N. Doc. A/35/10, at 90-93. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at note 114.
The elipsed section of Hannikainen's comments reflects jus cogens status to aggressive force
.within the territory of another state." This concerns the question of a state's consent to the use
of such force within its territory in a variety of contexts. Though interesting, that topic is beyond
the scope of the present paper.
For a listing of some of the writers who support the peremptory character of the prohibition
of the use of aggressive armed force, in addition to those mentioned elsewhere in this paper, see
Id. at 324, note 6.
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impermissible.0 However, that proscription upon a state's unilateral
discretion to use armed force did not apply in one situation: self-defense.70
Reviewing pre-League practice and doctrine, League Covenant
provisions, the Kellogg-Briand Pact era and thereafter, Brownlie asserts
that after 1920, when the effective legal regulation of armed force
appeared, that which became the operative international norm on armed
force in interstate relations was a regime that empowered states to use such
in reaction to an actual or imminent resort to armed force.'
Although efforts were undertaken to put regulation into the process
whereby a state had lawful recourse to engage in war under the League of
Nations, that option remained. Effectively, all the League Covenant did
was offer a series of procedural steps antecedent to the initiation of armed
force by one state against another.72

That gap was sought to be rectified with the Kellogg-Briand Pact,
a multilateral effort to make explicit the prohibition on the use of war as a
mode of settlement of international disputes., 3 Consequently, the Pact
constituted a legal regime declarative of the impermissible use of force.
The Pact process was, however, declarative of the permissible end
of the use of force spectrum as well. Specifically, a condition precedent to
the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact was the agreement on reservation of
69.

IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES chs. XII

and XIII (1963); DINSTEIN, supra note 21, at ch. 3.

70. See infra at 21-29.
71.

DINSTEIN, supra note 21, at ch. 3.

BROWNLIE, supra note 70, at 216-52, 254-55

(reflecting the U.N.G.A. 6th Committee discussions on defining aggression).

For an extended

discussion of the problems surrounding and the efforts to effect a definition of aggression, see
JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER (1959); DINSTEIN, supra note 21, at 123-32;
and THOMAS & THOMAS, THE CONCEPT OF AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, chs. I and II

(1972).
72.

ANTHONY CLARK AREND & ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE

OF FORCE 19-22 (1993).
Although arguably inconsistent with the availability of war to states under the Covenant,

article 10 provided:
The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members
of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of
such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which thisobligation will
be fulfilled.

Id.
Interpretations have generally affirmed the view that article 10 was intended as subordinate
to provisions which allowed for recourse to war in the face of the inability of the Council to act.
i.e., that such force would not constitute aggression. Id. at 21-22. This view, too, supports the
notion that what is not impermissible is permissible and vice versa.
73.

BROWNLIE, supra note 70, at 217-8; AREND & BECK, supra note 73, at 23.
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the right of legitimate self-defense. 1
Although Kellogg's original
conception had been for a complete renunciation of war, he assured the
French Ambassador that the renunciation of war did not deprive the
signatories of the right of legitimate defense.73 Written expressions of the
reservation of the right to self-defense were submitted by France, Great
6
Britain, and Japan.
Of decisive importance was the United States' Note of June 23,
1928." Concerning self-defense, it conveyed:
[t]here is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war
treaty which restricts or impairs in any way the right of
self-defense. That right is inherent in every sovereign
state and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at
all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its
territory from attack or invasion; and it alone is competent
to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in
self-defense. If it has good cause the world will applaud
and not condemn its action. Express recognition by treaty
of this inalienable right, however, gives rise to the same
difficulty encountered in any effort to define aggression. It
is the identical question approached from the other side.
Inasmuch as no treaty provision can add to the natural
right of self-defense, it is not in the interest of peace that a
treaty should stipulate a juristic conception of self-defense
since it is far too easy for the unscrupulous to mold events
with the agreed definition. 8
In their respective notifications of acceptance of a slightly revised
American draft, each of the recipient's of the United States' Note
expressly accepted or noted the interpretation put upon it in the United
States' Note.7 9 With these conditions, the treaty was signed without the
reservation appearing in the text. 1

BROWNLIE, supra note 70, at 235.
75. These assurances were made on March 1, 1928. Id.
76. Id. at 235-36.
77. That note, explaining the United States draft of April 13, was sent to Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, the Irish Free State, Italy,
Japan, New Zealand, Poland, and South Africa. Id. at 236.
78. Id. (quoting Kellogg's address to the American Society of International Law).
79. BROWNLIE, supra note 70 at 236-37.
80. Id. at 237.
74.

786

ILSA Journal of Int'l & ComparativeLaw

[Vol. 3:767

In contrast to state practice before 1920 and the writings of jurists
relative to that period, according to which the right of self-defense was
regarded as synonymous with the right of self-preservation including the
redress of wrongs, Brownlie asserts that such was not the regime that was
understood as part of customary practice after the Pact.' Rather, the
wording of the Pact and the expressed understandings of the parties about
self-defense are not reflective of such a broad scope for self-defense. 2 By
1928, the common meaning of aggression was attack or invasion or threat
thereof.'3 In the periods immediately before and after the conclusion of the
Pact the term legitimate defense appeared frequently in contexts in which it
had the sense of justified reaction to attack or threat of attack.14
With this as foundation, Brownlie notes:
[t]he legal developments of the period of the League had
the result that, while the right of self-preservation no
longer existed in its classical form some of its content was
preserved. This residual right was referred to as that of
self-defense or legitimate defense. It was understood that
this right of legitimate defense was subject to objective and
legal determination and that it was confined to reacting to
immediate danger to the physical integrity of the state itself
... . Unfortunately, the acceptance of the existence of a
legally defined right was not in fact accompanied by any
precise definition of the content of the right."
He continues:
In the period of the League the right of self-defense
commonly appeared in the context of the use of force. It
was essentially a reaction by a state against the use or
threat of force by the armed forces of another state ....
The essence of the right was proportionality to the threat
offered and this would create a presumption that force was
only lawful as a reaction against force.96

81.

Id. at 240.

82.

Id.

83. Id. at 240-41.
84. Id. at 241.
85.

BROWNLIE, supra note 70, at 252.

86. Id.
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Additionally, he notes that, for the years 1930-1939 "[s]tate
practice . . . fairly consistently supports the view that resort to force in
collective or self-defense is a reaction to an actual or imminent resort to
force. "81
According to Brownlie, the period from 1920 through 1939 marks
the end of a broad state entitlement to use force for such matters as
protection of rights or a generalized claim to self-preservation, in the face
of the norms whereby such uses of force exceed that which would be
available to rebut impermissible uses of force against a state."
Moving ahead chronologically, he submits:
In state practice both before and after the Second World
War resort to force by virtue of the right of self-defense is
almost without exception associated with the idea of
reaction against the use of force.
The concept of
aggression appeared as the right of self-preservation fell
into disrepute and in the period of the League and the
Second World War 'aggression' was synonymous with an
armed attack, the unlawful use of force, which justified
action in self-defense. 8
Consequently, self-defense had a more restricted and obvious meaning
than had existed prior to these efforts at incursions into state power to use
armed force.
For at least thirty years it has appeared in state practice
principally, though not exclusively, as a reaction to the use of force against
the territorial domain, the physical entity of a state. It is not surprising
that the draftsmen of the United Nations Charter should define it in article
51 by reference to the occurrence of an armed attack. 9
The practice of states from 1929-1945 does not suggest that selfdefense was "anything other than a reaction to force or threat of force
against the territory of a State."91
It is noteworthy that in its 1949 report on the Draft Declaration on
Rights and Duties of States, all members of the ILC regarded the right of
87. Id. at 250.
88. Brownlie does note, however, that protection of nationals may occupy a continuing
place. Id. at 250-52.
89. Id. at 255. His comments were also directed at dispelling the notion that self-defense
covers reaction to non-militarized forms of force or coercion.
90. Id. at 255-56. As his book was published in 1963, he is looking back to the early
1930s.
91. Brownlie, supra note 70, at 241, 251-52. He does note the existence of a few cases
that do not fit this general pattern.
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self-defense as exercisable through the medium of armed force only in case
of the threat of armed attack or actual armed attack. This was offered as
commentary upon draft article 12 which provided that every state has the
right of individual or collective self-defense against armed attack.Y
That such followed so swiftly upon and used the same armed
attack wording as article 51 of the United Nations Charter could well
reflect the then current understanding and intent in use of that terminology
in the Charter: retention of the right to armed self-defensive responses to
the threat or use of armed force as opposed to other coercive measures
short of military force.
What is clearly evident is that the regulation of the use of armed
force in interstate relations under international law that began in earnest
under the League system and the Kellogg-Briand Pact is that which
ultimately was incorporated and mostly recently codified in the United
Nations Charter. Presently, it is beyond challenge that the provisions of
article 2(4), prohibiting the threat or use of armed force in violation of a
state's territorial integrity and/or political independence, which necessarily
includes and incorporates the right to use such force in self-defense,
constitute still binding rules of traditional international law.
Not only was the normative regime on impermissible and
permissible armed force established prior to its incorporation into the
Charter, but the inherent nature of that regime was infused in the Charter
as well. It is one predicated upon a dyadic dynamic whereby what one
state is empowered to confront with armed force is that which, by
definition, is impermissible to the other.
92. [1949] Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 108-11, 145-47.
93.

DINSTEIN,

supra note 21,

at 93-94;

J.N.

SINGH,

USE OF

FORCE UNDER

INTERNATIONAL LAW at 9-20 (1984); see also Military and Parimilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at para. 190 (June 27) (reflecting contemporaneous,
simultaneous vitality of the pre-existent norm on the use of armed force between states and the
United Nations Charter regime).
Although the I.C.J., commentators, and others may have categorized the extra-Charteruse
of armed force as customary international law, this author suggests that such is not dispositive of
the normative rank to be accorded to that regime. Elevation to the status of jus cogens is effected
regardless of any prior categorization provided the normative regime fulfills the criteria identified
in article 53 of the Vienna Convention. While it is indeed unlikely that a norm could attain jus
cogens status without being considered, at a minimum, under customary international law, that
categorization is not determinative for jus cogens analysis. That assessment requires examination
into the extent of acceptance, state practice, and derogability.
Usage of the term traditional as a modifier of international law is used throughout the

original discussion presented to connote generally the extra-Charter normative regime to avoid
the confusion engendered by use of the terms customary international law and general
internationallaw as articulated in article 53 of the Vienna Convention.

94, at 10.

See SINGH, supra note
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As this was the existent regime when diplomats and scholars
referred to the impermissible use of force as the most conspicuous example
of jus cogens, this author suggests that it is that regime in its entirety, not
just one aspect of it, that is the non-derogable norm.9

C. The DialecticDyadic Dynamic
What is both apparent and key in this normative regime is the
inherent complementarity of the two ends of the use of force spectrum. 9

94. This does not mean that other uses of force might violate either the Charter or
customary international law norms but yet may not constitute jus cogens. This is analogous to
the I.C.J. comments in the Nicaragua case that there may well be impermissible uses of force that
do not run afoul of the customary international law prohibition against armed attack.
95. STONE, supra note 72, at 72-76. His book is generally directed at efforts to define
aggression. This sub-section, entitled The Attempted Approach to Definition through Armed
Attack, concludes that, although the term armed attack might seem to be more explicit than a
looser one such as aggression or even legitimate self-defense, no ground is effectively gained in
defining aggression by shifting the focus to the actions of the victim's permitted license of selfdefense against armed attack. Quite simply he notes:
If States generally accepted the view that all forceful self-redress by individual
Members is forbidden by the Charter exception 'self-defense against the armed attack
against a Member,' within article 51, they should certainly have rallied immediately to
the thesis that nothing more was necessary to denote" aggression' than to define 'selfdefense against armed attack'. For the concept of 'self-defense' would then not have
its vague customary law outlines but be more precisely limited by reference to 'armed
attack' as an observable phenomenon against which it reacts. Some problems would
remain . . . for instance of distinguishing what degree of violence 'armed attack' must
involve and . . . the proportionality requirements .

. .

. If States really accepted this

view of the Charter, indeed, the question of 'aggression' itself would become
irrelevant; the question what is 'armed attack' would have been substituted for it.
(citations omitted).
Id. at 72-73.
Further reflecting the relation between what is permissible and what is not, Stone notes the
comments of G.G. Fitzmaurice:
The whole problem is to determine when certain acts are justified and, therefore, are
not aggressive, and when they are not justified and therefore are aggressive. This
situation is one which can only be carried out in each particular case in the light of the
facts and the situation as it exists at the time, and cannot be achieved by a prior rule
laid down in advance.
Id. at 18 n.5.
An examination into the fifty-year effort to arrive at a definition of aggression, which was
purposefully not done at the time of the drafting of the Charter, is, regrettably, not feasible
within the constraints of this paper. However, it is to be noted that the result of that effort, the
U.N.G.A.R Definition of Aggression effectively recognizes the inter-relationship of the two ends
of the use of force spectrum. U.N.G.A./Agg, supra note 68. Specifically, the first use of armed
force is only prima facie evidence of aggression. The obvious result is that a state can
permissibly undertake a first strike presumably in anticipation of an armed attack and not be
deemed to have engaged in aggression.
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Evidenced in the writings of Judge Lauterpacht in 1935 and others even
before him, the notion of aggression as complementary to the notion of
self-defense, has a pedigree extending back into the pre-Charter/KelloggBriand Pact regime.' Kellogg himself regarded defense as the "conjunct
of aggression. "I
According to Stone, this view is very widely
acknowledged and is a correct one.9 Of equal vintage are the comments
of G. Schelle, in whose view:
The correspondence of the questions is exact, since
(matters of proportionality apart) only when aggression
occurs does the right of self-defense arise. Indeed, . . . all
that distinguishes self-defense from aggression is that the
former takes place first. So . . . when there was no legal
restraint on the license to go to war, there was also no
restraint on the right of self-defense ....
[I]ndeed that is
it because "la notion de legitime defense se definit par
l'agression," that this latter notion must be defined."
More contemporary recognition that complementarity between
self-defense and aggression remains a vital notion is reflected in the
jurisprudence of McDougal and Feliciano.o ° Additionally, J.N. Singh has
noted:
The existence of legal prohibition surely means the
absence of legal permission and likewise, the existence of
legal permission means the absence of legal prohibition in
regard to the same subject matter. In order to judge the
legality of a particular threat or use of force in a situation,
the examination of legal prohibitions as well as legal
permissions is necessary.101

96. STONE, supra note 72, at 75, citing: H. Lauterpacht, The Pact of Paris ...
TRANS. GROTIUS SOC. 178, at 199.
9'7.

(1935) 20

BROWNLIE, supra note 70, at 240.

98. STONE, supra note 72, at 75 n.182. Such a dynamic is unlikely to have been affected
by the passage of 37 years since Stone's book was published.
99.

STONE, supra note 72, at 75 n. 182.

100. MYRES SMITH McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM

WORLD PUBLIC ORDER ch. 3 (1961).
As noted by John Norton Moore, the notion of
complementarity is a refined version of the legal realists' observations that legal norms frequently
travel in pairs of complementary opposites such as self-defense-aggression.
John Moore,
Prolegomenon to the Jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, 54 VA. L. REV.

662 (1968) at 656 n.20.
101. SINGH, supra note 94, at 8.
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Given this inextricable linkage of the lawful and unlawful uses of
armed force, each can only be defined in relationship to one another.
According to Dinstein, "[t]he evolution of the idea of self defense in
international law goes hand in hand with the prohibition of aggression...
. [S]elf defense as a legitimate recourse to force is inextricably linked to
2
the antithesis of the employment of unlawful force by. . .its opponent.",
What is really subject to assessment within the dynamics of the
interstate use of armed force is considering where to draw the line.103
Operationally, it is only by examining the entirety of the exercise of armed
force between states that the boundary between proscription and
permission can be determined.
As a direct consequence, the fundamental use of force
proscription, reflected in the traditionalprohibition on the use or threat of
armed force against another state, necessarily implicates and defines the
countervailing permitted self defensive use of armed force as one which
encompasses the ability to defend against the use and the threat of armed
force as well.'°'
This interdependence not only effects the applicable substantive
prohibition and entitlement, but also implicates the applicable legal status
of the normative regime. Specifically, to the extent that the traditional
prohibition on the use of armed force is not jus dispositivum, but rather,
jus cogens, the integrity of the system, the maintenance of balance between
the two components of the system, mandate that its counterpart, the
permissible use of armed force be recognized as having that same
normative status.t10
V.

Is The Charter Subject to Jus Cogens Proscriptions?

What impact does recognition of the jus cogens character of the
use of armed force regime have on the Charter and the use of force regime
established thereunder? Is the Charter even subject to the jus cogens
regime described in the Vienna Convention? Three factors are relevant:
1) the Charter entered into force before the Vienna Convention was even
drafted,
2) the Vienna Convention is not by its terms, retroactive, and
102. DINSTEIN, supra note 21, at 177, citing Report of the International Law Commission,

32nd Session, 1980 11 (2) Int'l L. Comm'n Y.B. 1, 52.
103. DINSTEIN, supra note 21, at 177-78.
104. SINGH, supra note 94, at 14-20. Logic compels this conclusion as well.

105. It is indeed arguable that self-defense itself manifests the four criteria of peremptory
norm status and might, therefore, constitute jus cogens separately from its linkage with the illegal

use of force.
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3) the Vienna Convention has not seen universal ratification.
The answer is, however, presaged by recognizing that what was
enshrined in the United Nations Charter reflected pre-existent norms
prohibiting the unilateral use or threat of armed force and the correlative
right to undertake measures in self-defense.
Article 4 of the Vienna Convention limits its application to only
those treaties which have been concluded after the Convention's entry into
force. This is, however, without prejudice to the application of any rules
set forth in the Vienna Convention to which treaties would be subject
under international law independently from the Convention.1' Debate at
the Vienna Conference reflected concern that the Convention provision
preserve the operation of rules of customary international law as well as
take into account general principles of law which are a separate source of
international law.101 Article 4 was inserted to preserve the application to
treaties of any pre-existent rules of customary international law and
general principles of law.'10
Determining whether jus cogens has
application to the Charter upon an international law basis other than the
Convention regime, suggests analysis on whether jus cogens constitutes a
codification of customary international law or a progressive development.1 09
The distinction between these two categories is evinced in article
15 of the Statute of the International Law Commission. According to that
statute, progressive development of international law means "the
preparation of draft Conventions on subjects which have not yet been
regulated by international law or in regard to which the law has not yet
been sufficiently developed in the practice of states." 10° Codification of
106. Article 4 provides:

Non-retroactivity of the Present Convention
Without prejudice to the application of any rules set forth in the present Convention to
which treaties would be subject under international law independently of the

Convention, the Convention applies only.to treaties which are concluded by states after
the entry into force of the present Convention with regard to such states.
Vienna Convention, supra note 25.
107. SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 8.
108. Id. at 249; I.C.J. Statute, art. 38(1)(b) (1945).
109. This approach is not meant to exclude consideration of jus cogens as a general
principle of law, under the theory expressed by some that it represents, on the international level,

the prohibition most legal systems recognize on the non-enforcement of contracts deemed in
violation of law and/or public policy.

Considerations of space preclude an in-depth presentation

of this positivist theme as an underpinning of jus cogens.

For a more detailed discussion see

SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 204-06.
Additionally as previously suggested, assessment of a norm as customary international law

for this analysis does not preclude its promotion to jus cogens. See supra note 4, at 94.
110. SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 11.
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international law is defined to contemplate "the more precise formulation
and systematization of rules of international law in fields where there
already has been extensive state practice, precedent, and doctrine."I'
In submitting its final set of draft articles on the law of treaties, the
ILC did not specifically categorize whether its work was either progressive
development or codification. "2
Rather, in its covering report, the
commission stated:
The Commission's work on the law of treaties constitutes
both codification and progressive development of
international law in the sense in which those concepts are
defined in article 15 of the Commission's Statute and, as
was the case with several previous drafts, it is not
practicable to determine into which category each
provision falls."3
The ILC characterized its work on jus cogens as similarly
reflecting this dichotomy. The ILC expressed the view that the draft
article on peremptory norms involved partly a codification and partly a
progressive development of international law." 4 It acknowledged that
peremptory norms exist in international law that permit no derogation and
set down a general definition of jus cogens.11,
The progressive
development component would then relate to the specifics, i.e., which
norms were to be accorded jus cogens status. This the ILC left to be
worked out by state practice and the jurisprudence of international
tribunals. 1,6
That the use of force regime proposed herein as jus cogens is
declarative of a pre-existing normative regime supports the notion that the
regime is applicable to the Charter independently of the Vienna
Convention."' To the extent that these norms were pre-existent and merely
111. Id.
112. Id. at 12.
113. Int'l L. Comm'n [1966] Y.B. 177; SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 12.
114. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 162.
115. That definition is "[a] norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character." Vienna
Convention, supra note 25, art. 53.
116. See Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 114, at 76; HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 162.
117. That the use of force regime described herein existed as a recognized normative regime
in customary international law before the Charter, has been confirmed by the I.C.J. in the
Nicaragua litigation. Military and Parimilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 126-34, at para. 175-94 (June 27). Consequently, even were the Vienna
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codified in the Charter renders the Charter subject to the operation of jus
cogens even though it came into force before the promulgation of the

Vienna Convention.",
There

are effectively

two prerequisites

for the

retroactive

application of the Vienna Convention provisions on jus cogens. The first
component, establishing that peremptory norms exist in international law,
is in this case, established and confirmed by that which would generally be
the second and more difficult hurdle of establishing what the particular
peremptory norm is.
What is at issue is the extent to which there is a regime concerning
the use of armed force in interstate relations from which states are not free
to derogate. To the extent that the Charter reflects and embodies the preexistent norms regulating the use of that armed force, nothing new is being
offered. The United Nations Charter regime is merely reflective of the
pre-existent norms, the customary international law, to which all member
states have signaled their acknowledgment of continuing allegiance and
obedience to.' 19
Furthermore, there is nothing novel or progressive in categorizing
the use of armed force regime as non-derogable. No restrictions upon a
state's recourse to such force which did not previously exist, would be
imposed. 20

Convention not applicable, the principles of articles 53 and 64 would be effective as customary
law. FRL, supra note 38, at 331, n.4.
118. Determining into which category a particular provision of the Vienna Convention falls
is, Sinclair suggests, effected predominantly by implication. SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 12. The
I.C.J. in the Namibia decision, in determining whether another rule of the Vienna Convention
[termination on account of material breach] would be applicable under customary international
law independently of the Convention, noted the voting record at the Vienna Convention relating
to its adoption as relevant. Id. at 20.
119. The comments of the I.C.J. in the Nicaragua case are, again, enlightening:
[To deduce the existence of customary rules .. .the conduct of States should, in
general be consistent with such rules... instances of State conduct inconsistent with a
given rule should generally be treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the
recognition of a new rule. If a State acts in a way prima facie incompatible with a
recognized rule, but defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications
contained within the rule itself. . . the significance of that attitude is to confirm rather
than weaken the rule.
Military and Parimilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 130,
at para. 186 (June 27).
120. Returning again to the Nicaraguacase, the I.C.J. decision made clear that a breach of
this extra-Charter customary international law regime remains both cognizable and punishable.
Military and Parimilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at
para. 126 (June 27).
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To the contrary, those who would argue that changes in the preexistent regime under the Charter effect a diminishment of the customary
principles

are the true advocates

of a progressive

development.' 2'

Consequently, it would appear clear that the traditionaluse of armed force
regime is an independent basis for the application of the jus cogens
proscription, free from the non-retroactive provision of the Vienna
Convention.
VI. Is the Charter in Derogation of Jus Cogens?
The ultimate penalty of voidness only results if a treaty is in
derogation of jus cogens at the time of the conclusion of the treaty or as
such emerges thereafter.In Consequently, the question is whether articles
2(4) and 51 of the Charter conform to the jus cogens armed force regime.
This task obviously requires interpretation of the Charter. Attention,
therefore, needs to be turned to interpretive modalities and materials to
determine the consistency of the Charter with the jus cogens regime
proposed herein as well as the absence of any newly emerged norm.
A. How is the Charterto be Interpreted?
Naturally, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides rules
for interpretation. These include:
Article 31. General Rule of Interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accord and
with the ordinary meaning to be given the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its objects and
purpose ....

121. There are two simultaneous, yet independent regimes concerning the use of armed
force; one under the Charter and the other under pre-existing norms. Id., at 126-34, para. 175194. In addition to finding that the Charter itself explicitly referenced pre-existent customary
international law by referring to the inherent right of self-defense in article 51, the Court referred
to two pre-Charter documents in finding the opinio juris supporting the customary international
law regime on the prohibition of force reflected in article 2(4). Id. at 127, para. 176 and at 13032, para. 186-89. Consequently, assuming a different, more restrictive regime under the Charter
does not mean, absent evidence of state practice and opinion juris, that such has altered
customary law. As the customary regime remains, treaty based restrictions have not effected a
progressive development. Although new peremptory norms can emerge (i.e. progressively
develop) there is no evidence that a new normative regime, in contradistinction to the Charter
regime, has deprived the traditional regime on the use of armed force of its abiding existence,
applicability, and vitality.
122. The remedy for the violation differs slightly if a new norm emerges after the treaty.
Vienna Convention, supra note 25, art. 53, 64, 71.

ILSA Journalof Int'l & ComparativeLaw

796

[Vol. 3:767

3. There shall be taken into account, together with the
context: ....
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which established the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation;
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the
relations between the parties.
4.

A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is

established that the parties so intended.
Article 32. Supplementary Means of Interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty
and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of
article 31, or to determine the meaning when the
interpretation according to article 31:
(a) Leaves the
meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) Leads to a result
which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
These provisions have been referred to as a general expression of
the principles of customary international law of treaty interpretation12 3
Pre-dating the Convention regime and still evident in its terms are three
primary schools of thought concerning the aim and goal of treaty
interpretation. As reflected in the writings of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice:
[tlhere are today three main schools of thought on the
subject, which could be conveniently called the 'intentions
of the parties' or 'founding fathers' school; the 'textual' or
'ordinary meaning of the words' school; and the
'teleological' or 'aims and objects' school. The ideas of
these three schools are not necessarily exclusive of one
another, and theories of treaty interpretation can be
constructed and are indeed normally held compounded of
all three. 24

123. SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 153.

124. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the InternationalCourt of Justice:
Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points, 28 BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF
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All three approaches, individually or as components within the
Vienna Convention approach, retain import in efforts to interpret the
Charter.'2 ' What will become apparent in the subsequent analysis is that,
regardless of which modality is selected, the same outcome is obtained:
the Charter's consistency with the jus cogens use of armed force regime
proposed in this paper.
Equally clear is the place and import to be given to examination of
the relevant travaux preparatoires in efforts to determine the meaning of
the text, the intention of the parties, and the object and purpose of the
United Nations Charter, notwithstanding any counterassertions predicated
upon the Vienna Convention provisions. '2
As Sinclair notes:
[t]he question of recourse to travaux preparatoires has
often been regarded as the touchstone which serves to
distinguish the adherents of the 'textual' approach from the
adherents of the 'intentions' approach ....
In any event,
it is clear that no would-be interpreter of a treaty,
whatever his doctrinal point of departure, will deliberately
ignore any material which can usefully serve as a guide
towards establishing the meaning of the text with which he
is confronted. 12
Such investigative options as are provided by the travaux and other
extrinsic material are not cast aside by the Vienna Convention. The rules
for interpretation set forth in the Vienna Convention do not, according to
Sinclair, establish a fixed, inflexible hierarchy between the general rule set
forth in article 31 and supplementary means of interpretation provided for
in article 32.'2' Rather, the would-be interpreter is still expected to have

INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1951), cited in DAN CIOBANU, IMPACT OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF
THE CHARTER UPON ITS INTERPRETATION 31, in CURRENT PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

(Antonio Cassese ed. 1975); SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 115.

125. According to Sinclair, the Vienna Convention's rules on interpretation constitute an
economical code ofprinciples which nonetheless have their value.
By placing emphasis on the key elements of treaty interpretation, and on the

relationship between these elements, the Convention rules establish a set of guidelines
which are not only firmly grounded in antecedent state practice and international case
law but which serve to indicate to the would-be interpretor the relative weight which.
. would be attribute[ed] to each of those elements.
SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 153-54.
126. SINCLAIR, supra note 4, at 115-16.

127. Id. at 116.
128. Id. at 117.
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recourse to all the materials that will provide evidence relative to the
meaning of the text when confronted with a question concerning treaty
interpretation which ex hypothesi, involves an argument as to the meaning
of the text., 29
Most enlightening and indicative of the synthetic approach to be
taken in interpretative efforts concerning the United Nations Charter and
the continuing relevance of the travaux, are the comments of Goodrich and
Hambro on the then new Charter.
In interpreting the Charter, we encounter one very special
problem of treaty interpretation, namely, that of the weight
to be attached to preparatory work (travaux preparatoires).
The general principle to be followed seems reasonably
clear.
In the words of the Permanent Court of
International Justice 'there is no occasion to have regard to
preparatory work if the text of a convention is sufficiently
clear in itself.' But the practice of the Permanent Court
seems clearly to support the view that preparatory work
should be consulted with a view to determining the true
intent of the parties where there is any doubt as to the
meaning of the words used. We would thus seem to be
justified in making extensive and fairly detailed reference
to the discussions that took place in UNCIO, not only to
give some understanding of the play of forces that
occurred, but also to throw light on the actual meaning of
the Charter. ,10
Given the extent and virulence of the debate on such issues as the
meaning of article 2(4) and that of the terms armed attack and the inherent
right of self-defense articulated in article 51 of the United Nations Charter,
significant questions of interpretation remain. Even under the arguably
more strictly defined and structured Vienna Convention interpretation
regime, this obviously implicates recourse to the travaux in an effort to
interpret both articles 2(4) and 5 1.

129. Id.
130. LELAND M. GOODRICH & EDVARD

HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:

COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 48-49 (1946) [hereinafter GOODRICH & HAMBRO].

UNCIO

refers to the United Nations Conference on International Organization held in San Francisco from
April 25 through June 1945, when the Charter was signed. Id. at 11.
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B. What Limitations Are There in the Charter on the Legitimate
Right of Self Defense ?
Before beginning that specific inquiry, it seems appropriate to be
mindful of the comments of the Rapporteurs of Subcommittee 1/1/A and
Committee I of Commission I:
The provisions of the Charter, being in this case indivisible
as in any other legal instrument, are equally valid and
operative. The rights, duties, privileges, and obligations
of the Organization and its members match with one
another and complement one another to make a whole.
Each of them is construed to be understood and applied in
function to the others. 131
Turning first to the Charter restriction on a state's unilateral
recourse to force ultimately contained in article 2(4), the reports of the
subcommittee and committee on its content clearly show that no
interference was intended or anticipated in a state's inherent right to
engage in legitimate self-defense.
The original proposal in the Dumbarton Oaks proposal made no2
mention of either territorial integrity or political independence.1
However, the subcommittee unanimously approved an Australian
amendment which added this phraseology and passed the resulting article
on to the committee as a new paragraph.'33 That amendment effectively
wrote the article as it would appear in the Charter.'3'

131. Subcommittee I/I/A and Committee 1 of Commission 1 were responsible for drafting
the Preamble, Principles and Purposes of the Charter. Id. at 12. Their reports are published in
volume 6 of the official multivolume series entitled, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. Doc. 723, I/llA19, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 696 (1945)
[hereinafter Subcommittee I/l/A].
132. Chapter II. Principles: (4) "All members of the organization shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the organization." Do. 1, G/I, 3 U.N.C.1.O. Does. 3 (1945).
133. Commission I, Committee 1, Report of Rapporteur Subcommittee 1/1/A to Committee
I/1, Doe. 739, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 720 (1945) [hereinafter Doe. 739].
134. Committee Il, Appendix to Rapporteur'sReport, Doe. 908, I/l/34(a), 6 U.N.C.I.O.
Does. 404 (1945).
As adopted by the subcommittee and approved by the Committee, the
provision read that "[aill members [of the Organization] shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence

of any [member or] state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations." Id.
The differences between this draft and the final provision are merely editing variations
deleting the words in brackets.
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Although other amendments had been proposed and rejected by the
subcommittee, one by the Norwegian Government had proposed that no
force should be used if not approved by the Security Council. As
discussion of this amendment helped to "clarify the Australian amendment
itself," and "helps to explain the present text," the Subcommittee
Rappporteur offered the following few words in his report to the
committee: "I
The sense of approval was considered ambiguous because
it might mean that approval before or after the use of
force. It might thus curtail the right of states to use force
in legitimate self-defense, while it was clear to the
subcommittee that the right of self-defense against
aggression should not be impaired or diminished. It was
on these understandings that the subcommittee voted the
36
text submitted to you.'
At the subsequent meeting of the committee, attention was focused on the
proposed new paragraph 4 including the words of the Australian
amendment which had been accepted by the drafting subcommittee.'"7 This
amendment provoked considerable discussion." That discussion reflects
the following:
The Delegate of New Zealand said that though he would
vote for the text including the Australian amendment...
his Delegation did not regard this text as an adequate
substitute for the original suggestion by New Zealand...
relating to a collective undertaking to resist aggression. 9
The Delegate of Brazil said that the change, made in the
text to incorporate the Australian amendment, had not
removed the element of ambiguity . .. and he suggested
135. Doc. 739, supra note 134, at 720-22.
136. Id. at 721. These understandings also included a note that "there will be no legitimate
wars in any sense." Id. (emphasis added).

137. Summary Report of Eleventh Meeting of Committee I/1, Doc. 784, I/1/27, 6
U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 331 (1945) [hereinafter Committee I/1].
138. Id. at 334.
139. New Zealand had submitted an amendment, reflecting a "notion found in many other
amendments" that read:

"[A]II members of the Organization undertake collectively to resist

every act of aggression against any member." That amendment was rejected by a majority not
reaching two-thirds primarily because: "(1) The key-note for collectivity is found in the opening
words of this Chapter ....

(2) The amendment limits itself to the collective resistance of every

act of aggression, aggression not being defined." Doc. 739, supra note 134, at 721.
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that, apart from the use of legitimate self-defense, the text
as it stood at present might well be interpreted as
authorizing the use of force unilaterally by a state,
claiming that such action was in accordance with the
purposes of the Organization. He suggested that it was
essential to clarify this by some wording as "all members
of the Organization shall refrain
from the threat or use
of force unless such action was being taken according to
procedures established by the Organization and in
accordance with its decisions."°
The Delegate of Norway said that the committee should
reconsider the present language which did not seem to
reflect satisfactorily its intention, and thought that in any
case it should be made very clear in the Report to the
Commission that this paragraph 4 did not contemplate any
use of force, outside of action by the Organization, going
beyond individual or collective self-defense. He was
himself in favor of omitting the specific phrase relating to
"territorial integrity and political independence" since this
was, on the one hand, a permanent obligation under
international law and, on the other hand, could be said to
be covered by the phrase sovereign equality, as suggested
in the commentary by the Rapporteur.
The Delegate of the United Kingdom said that he did not
dissent from the reasoning of the Norwegian Delegate, but
he thought that the wording of the text had been carefully
considered so as to preclude interference with the
4
enforcement clauses of chapter VIII of the Charter.'
The Delegate of the United States made it clear that the
intention of the authors of the original text was to state in
the broadest terms an absolute all-inclusive prohibition; the

140 Id.
141. This numbering reflects the original Dumbarton Oaks proposal. The United Nations
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for a General International Organization, 3 U.N.C.I.O. 12-19, Doc.
G/I (1945). Entitled "Arrangements for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security
Including Prevention and Suppression of Aggression," then chapter VIII included Security
Council authority over the pacific settlement of disputes, determination of threats to the peace and
acts of aggression, as well as provisions relating to regional arrangements. These provisions
were separated into different chapters and articles in the final United Nations Charter.
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phrase or in any other manner was designed to insure that
42
there should be no loopholes. 1
In recommendations to the commission, the committee Rapporteur
noted the subcommittee's preliminary report had "received in full
committee an adequate general acceptance which allows it to remain an
element of the preparatory work that led to the committee's- final
recommendations. "'3
Concerning this new paragraph 4, the committee report reflects:
The committee decided to include the Australian
amendment so that the paragraph comes before you under
a new text.
The committee likes it to be stated in view of the
Norwegian amendment to the same paragraph that the
unilateral use of force or similar coercive measures is not
authorized or admitted. The use of arms in legitimate selfdefense remains admitted and unimpaired.14'
In connection with paragraph 4, a motion was considered
which the committee wishes to see mentioned in this
report. It was to add after paragraph 4 the following text:
"[A]Il members of the Organization undertake collectively
to resist any act of aggression against any member."
That motion, the committee wishes to state, had twenty six
45
votes in favor and eighteen against.
Clearly, there was every indication that the delegates recognized
such a prohibition as that contemplated in new paragraph 4 could impact
on self-defense and thus specifically rejected the notion that the proposed
regime was intended to interfere, interrupt, or compromise legitimate self142. Committee I/1, supra note 138, at 334-35.

(Emphasis added).

What is noteworthy in the recorded debate is the absence of any opposition to the comments
stating that the right to legitimate self-defense was clearly excluded from the use of force
proscription. Given such explicit acceptance and lack of challenge, it was clear that such were to
remain intact.
143. Report of the Rapporteur of Committee 1 to Commission I, Doc.885, 6 U.N.C.I.O.
Docs. 387 (1945) [hereinafter Committee 1, Doc. 885].
144. The Norwegian amendment, which was not approved by the subcommittee had sought
to prohibit the use of force if not approved by the Security Council. See supra note 39.
145. Thus the motion failed to meet the two-third majority required for passage. Discussion
appears at Committee 1, Doc. 885, supra note 144, at 400.
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defense in any way. Nor was there any notation or intimation that this
self-defense entitlement was not to apply to a threat of force as well. As is
evident, article 2(4) was intended to reflect the dialectic dynamic in the use
of force regime: On the one hand, the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity, political independence of another state is not permitted
while, on the other, the protective response mechanism, self-defense,
remains inviolate.
Obviously, the content of that right was that which was existent at
the time of the drafting efforts, otherwise the use of the word that remains
in the discussions would have been nonsensical. However, more in-depth
corroboration for that conclusion lies in an examination of the travaux for
what has become article 51, the only article in the Charter that specifically
refers to self-defense.
The discussion of self-defense arose in conjunction with the
concerns of the Latin American countries to insure the freedom of action
of their regional arrangement, most recently expressed and envisioned in
the Act of Chapultepec, to provide collective self-defense yet remain
within the United Nations framework. '4
The principal debate upon this provision at the UNCIO occurred in
commission III, committee 4 and subcommittee 111/4/A.' 4 7 Provisions for
regional arrangements had appeared in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals as
section C of chapter VIII, but made no reference or provision for general
collective self-defense efforts by such entities. 48

146. GOODRICH & HAMBRO, supra note 131, at 175-83.

147. See generally 12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 663-866 (1945).
148. The Dumbarton Oaks proposal read as follows:
Section C. Regional Arrangements. 1. Nothing in the Charter should preclude the
existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to
the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional
action, provided such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with
The Security Council should
the purposes and principles of the Organization.
encourage settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such

regional agencies, either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from
the Security Council.

2. The Security Council should, where appropriate, utilize such arrangements or
agencies for enforcement action under its authority, but no enforcement action should
be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization
of the Security Council.
3. The Security Council should at all times be kept fully informed of activities
undertaken or in contemplation under the regional arrangements or by regional
agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Dumbarton Oaks Proposal, Doc. 1, 3 U.N.CI.O. Docs 18-19 (1945).
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The provision reflecting self-defense was a new paragraph
recommended for inclusion by the unanimous vote of subcommittee
111/4/A to committee 111/4. '49 That new paragraph read as follows:
Nothing in this Charter (shall) impair(s) the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a member (of the United Nations) state,

until the Security Council has taken (the) measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security.

Measures taken in the exercise of self-defense shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not
in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the

Security Council under this Chapter to take such action as
it (may) deem(s) necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.ln°
The subcommittee was unanimous in recommending this text to the
committee.'"'
At its fourth meeting committee 111/4 considered the

recommendations of the subcommittee.- 2 The new paragraph was
approved unanimously."
Debate, as there was on this provision, is instructive for what it
did not reflect: there was no evident intent to change the pre-existent selfdefensive regime notwithstanding the usage of the term armed attack nor
any indication that a state's right to self-defense was extinguished at any
time prior to the existence of a peace available to be maintained by the
Security Council.

As the discussion below reflects, however, there was provision for the use of force by the
European states against the enemy states outside the Security Council context, which precipitated
much of the debate.
149. Interim Report To Committee 111/4 by Subcommittee III/4/A on the Amalgamation of
Amendment, Dr. V.K. Wellington Koo, Doc. 533, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 533, 848 (1945)
[hereinafter Interim Report/533].
150. Id. at 849. The words in parenthesis reflect changes, either additions or deletions, that
were made in the proposal and reflected in the final article. The only modification that would
appear to have substantive implications is the deletion of the word from its place immediately
preceding measures necessary in the first sentence.
151. Id., at 849. Issue was joined concerning the proper placement of the article within the
Dumbarton Oaks proposal. Id. This debate was more heated and extensive than that concerning
the text of the article itself. See Summary Report of Fourth Meeting of Committee 111/4, Doc.
576, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 682-84 (1945) [hereinafter Committee 111/4, Doc. 576]; Draft Report
of Dr. V.K. Wellington Koo, Rapporteur of Committee 111/4, to Commission III, Doc. 891, 12
U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 724 (1945) [hereinafter Committee 111/4, Doc. 891].
152. Committee 111/4, Doc. 576, supra note 152, at 679.
153. Id.at 680.
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The discussion reflects, in pertinent part, the following:
In connection with this decision, the Chairman, speaking
as the Delegate of Columbia, made the following
statement:
The Latin American Countries understood, as Senator
Vandenberg had said that the origin of the term 'collective
self-defense' is identified with the necessity of preserving
regional systems like the Inter-American one.
The
Charter, in general terms, is a constitution, and it
legitimizes the right of collective self-defense to be carried
out in accord with the regional pacts so long as they are
not opposed to the purposes and principles of the
Organization as expressed in the Charter. If a group of
countries with regional ties declare their solidarity for their
mutual defense, as in the case of the American states, they
will undertake such defense jointly if and when one of
them is attacked. And the right of defense is not limited to
the country which is the direct victim of aggression but
extends to those countries which have established
solidarity, through regional arrangements, with the country
directly attacked. This is the typical case of the American
system.
The Act of Chapultepec provides for the
collective defense of the hemisphere and established that if
an American nation is attacked all the rest consider
themselves attacked. Consequently, such action as they
may take to repel aggression, authorized by the article
which was discussed in the subcommittee yesterday, is
legitimate for all of them. Such action would be in accord
with the Charter, by the approval of the article, and a
regional arrangement may take action, provided it does not
have improper purposes as, for example, joint aggression
against another state. From this, it may be deduced that
the approval of this article implies that the Act of
Chapultepec is not in contravention of the Charter.
The Delegates of Mexico, Costa Rica, Paraguay,
Venezuela, Chile, Ecuador, Bolivia, Panama, Uruguay,
Peru, Guatemala, El Salvador, Brazil, Honduras, and
Cuba associated themselves with this statement ....
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The Delegate of Argentina associated himself with the
statement of the Chairman ....
The Delegate of France expressed his desire to give
utterance to the voice of Europe amidst the general concert
of the Latin American nations. In his opinion, the formula
approved by the Committee extended in general to cases of
mutual assistance against aggression.
The Delegate of Czechoslovakia expressed his satisfaction
that the text approved effectively reconciled the right of
self-defense, individual, and collective, with the
maintenance of a central authority capable of dealing with
the problems of security as they arose.
The Delegate of Egypt observed that the principle involved
in the new text should certainly extend to the League of
Arab States. The delegate for Australia said that, in
supporting the amendment, . . . the phrase "individual or
collective security" was regarded by the Australian
Delegation as sufficiently wide to cover that part of the
Australian amendment referring to the right of the parties,
in certain circumstances, to adopt necessary measures to
maintain international peace and security in accordance
with any arrangements consistent with the Charter. 154
The Delegate of New Zealand expressed apprehension lest
regional arrangements tend to produce conflict between
regional groups.
His delegation attached primary
importance to the supremacy of the world Organization.
155

During the discussion on the operation and interaction between the
provisions concerning pacific settlement of disputes, regional arrangements
and the Security Council, the Chairman of Committee 111/4 stated:

[I]f at any time an armed attack should ensue, that is, an
aggression against a state which is a member of a regional
group, self-defense, whether individual or collective,
154. Reference to security was subject to a subsequent Corrigendum noted at 12 U.N.C.I.O.
Doc. 689 (1945).
155. Committee 111/4, Doc. 576, supra note 152, at 680-82.
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exercised as an inherent right, shall operate automatically
within the provisions of the Charter, until such time as the
Security Council may take appropriate punitive measures
againstthe aggressorstate.
In the case of the American states, an aggression against
one American state constitutes an aggression against all
the American states, and all of them exercise their right of
legitimate defense by giving support to the state attacked,
in order to repel such aggression. 'This is what is meant by
the right of collective self-defense. -6
No challenge, repudiation or objection was noted in the travaux to
this view.' 7 There is, consequently, no evidence in these recorded
discussions of any debate on or intent to include norms in the Charter to
compromise, change or impact upon the pre-existent prohibition on the use
of armed force and the correlative right to self-defense.
There is, however, additional documentation reflecting discussion
during the San Francisco Conference amongst members of the United
States delegation, the other sponsoring states and France, as well as other
national representatives, outside the reported subcommittee and committee
meetings that are crucial to an understanding of events and decisions that
occurred during the Conference and are, thus, highly relevant to assessing
the content, definition and intent behind article 2(4), the self-defense
entitlement in article 51 and the role of the Security Council.
For the United States delegation, discussion on self-defense arose
early, in connection with consideration of that provision of the Dumbarton
Oaks proposals that would find final form as article 2(4). On April 26,
1945, discussion at the 18th meeting of the United States Delegation
reflects concern over a proposed amendment to chapter II, 4 of the
Dumbarton Oaks proposals. 58 That proposed amendment read: "[a]ll
members of the organization shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the
purposes and principles of the Organization and the provisions of the
Charter. "59
156. Id. at 685-87 (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 684-88.
158. 1 Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers (1945), General: The
United Nations (1967), at 425-29 [hereinafter Foreign Relations of the United States ]. The
original proposal appears at note 133.
159. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 426. The delegation decided
against supporting this amendment, preferring the original language. Id. at 427.
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Senator Vandenberg said he "was nervous about the problem of
self-defense in view of the long arguments that had occurred in the Senate
when the Kellogg-Briand Pact came up. The Foreign Relations Committee
of the Senate had never been willing to yield until a reservation on the
subject of self-defense was made." 10
The question was posed why it would not be advisable to include
the qualification about self-defense in the Charter, as there was concern
that if no mention was made in the Charter, the Senate would make a
reservation.
Mr. Stassen specifically asked what would be the
disadvantage of including an explicit statement in the Charter that "nothing
in the Charter takes away the right of self-defense."'
As ultimately approved, article 2(4) contained no explicit reference
to self-defense. The Committee of five recommended that the Dumbarton
Oaks proposal be amended by the inclusion of an Australian amendment
adding the language "against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any member or state."6 2 Described as a statement
regarding the preservation against external aggression of the territorial
integrity and political independence of members, Dean Gildersleeve, the
United States delegate to the relevant Committee, pointed out the
importance of this provision to the smaller nations who wanted this
specification to make them feel more secure. Additionally, approval of
this amendment needed to be considered against a New Zealand
amendment seeking to guarantee territorial integrity that was receiving
163
considerable backing.
Although an explicit reference to self-defense was not inserted into
article 2(4), the issue was far from dead. It resurfaced in the course of the
extended debates on regional arrangements and the use of armed force
from which article 51 ultimately resulted. In fact, the central figures in the
process by which self-defense became the means to resolve the problem of
regional arrangement authority, were those who had earlier suggested
including a specific reservation of the right to self-defense in the Charter
itself.
Extensive documentation exists on the drafting history of article 51
in the United States Foreign Relations documents. Recourse to these
materials has a special significance in this particular area, as it was the
160. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 426-27. Vandenberg
repeatedly voiced concern about Senate ratification were no express reservation of the right of
self-defense was included in the Charter. Id. at 594.
161. Id. at 428.
162. Id. at 747.

163. Id. at 726.
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United States that bore the task of accommodating the desires of the Latin
American States to the demands of the other sponsoring powers and
participating states. As events reflect that what became article 51 was
adopted by the Subcommittee and Committee without amendment in the
form presented to them by Senator Vandenberg, the drafting efforts and
negotiations that preceded the submission of the proposal offer invaluable
insight.
On May 4, 1945, the United States delegates met and discussed the
problem concerning the relationship of the security provisions of the
general organization to hemispheric defense, particularly in relation to
Chapter VIII, Section C, of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals dealing with
regional arrangements.' According to these provisions, no enforcement
action could be undertaken by a regional organization without the
authorization of the Security Council.'"6 The Dumbarton Oaks proposals
contained no agreement on voting arrangements.'" That agreement,
subsequently reached at Yalta, provided for the veto power. Such, it was
feared, could render regional action subject to the veto of any one state.1 6,
In commentary, Senator Vandenberg noted that the proposals "spelled the
end of the Monroe Doctrine."'" As French and Soviet proposals provided
that action in Europe could be taken under bilateral treaty without any
intervention or authorization by the Security Council it was, therefore,
considered "extremely important to protect our concept of preclusive
rights in this hemisphere." 6 9
Delegate Stassen was noted to comment:
[i]t was essential to permit the Security Council to
authorize enforcement action .... On the other hand, we
retained the essential right of self-defense. We could act if
we were attacked, but we then would have to begin
immediately presenting to the Security Council what we
were doing in our own defense.170
Senator Vandenberg, again recalling the debates on self-defense
that occurred in connection with the Kellogg-Briand Pact, asked whether
there was any way to express the right to self-defense which was claimed
164. Id. at 588-97. The initial Dumbarton Oaks Proposal appears supra note 148.
165. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 591.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 592.
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as inherent, yet not throw the door open to individual action. In response,
Mr. Stassen noted that there should be no effort to define the right of selfdefense because "to define it simply raised the question as to what
constitutes self-defense." 171
Excerpts of a report from the Acting United States Secretary of
State to Diplomatic Representatives in the American Republics provide a
brief overview of events during the San Francisco Conference through
mid-May 1945, concerning the evolving regional organization conundrum.
The question of the relation of regional arrangements to the international
organization passed through two phases at the San Francisco Conference.
In the first phase it was raised by the Russians, with the strong
support of the French and the tacit support of the British, in relation to the
bilateral pacts negotiated among European states and directed against
enemy states in the present war. To this [a Soviet amendment to Chapter
VIII, Section C, of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposal] the United States
presented a counterproposal to which the Soviets, after considerable
debate, finally agreed. That counterproposal read as follows:
No enforcement action should be taken under regional
arrangements or by regional agencies without the
authorization of the Security Council with the exception of
measures against enemy states in this war provided for
pursuant to Chapter XII, Paragraph 2, or, in regional
arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy
on the part of such states, until such time as the
organization may, by consent of the governments
concerned, be charged with the responsibility for
preventing further aggression by a state now at war with
the United Nations ....
An indirect result of the presentation of this four power
amendment was unfortunately to open the second phase of
the problem of regional arrangements at the conference by
giving a considerable number of the Latin American
delegations the impression that European regional
arrangements were being removed from the control of the
Security Council whereas the much older and betterestablished regional system of the Western Hemisphere
would be subjected to the domination of the Council.
They were particularly fearful that, in view of the veto

171. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 593.
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power exercised by each of the permanent members of the
Council, a non-American state would be able to prevent
enforcement action of any kind under the Act of
Chapultepec ....
The United States delegation found itself faced by most
difficult alternatives ....
Various compromises were discussed. The Australians
and the French suggested that it might be possible to
authorize enforcement action under regional arrangements
if the Security Council in a particular case did not find
itself able to agree upon effective action on its own
account.'7
[t]he American delegation finally came to the
conclusion that the best solution lay in an explicit statement
in the charter of that inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense ....

Credit for re-framing the issue from one of exempting the Western
Hemispheric regional arrangement to that of self-defense would apparently
go to Mr. Stassen who had, in connection with article 2(4), previously
suggested the advisability of an explicit reference to self-defense in the
Charter.
Stassen's idea was presented at the 35th meeting of the United
States delegates on May 10, 1945. Notes of that meeting reflect:
Mr. Stassen stated that he had another idea in
connection with the regional question ....
[He] pointed out that he had heard over and over
again that the basic objection to the present plan was the
inability of a regional organization to act in the event of an
arbitrary veto of one of the major powers. He said that he
had come to the conclusion that it might be best to spell
172. A French amendment to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals that received much support
read: "Should the Council not succeed in reaching a decision, the members of the organization
reserve to themselves the right to act as they may consider necessary in the interests of peace,
right and justice." U.N.C.I.O., supra note 133, at 385. It is important to note that this
approach, which would hinge a state's self-defensive actions to Security Council inaction, was
ultimately rejected.
173. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 831-34.
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out in the Charter the right of self-defense, in order to
meet the recurrent criticism on this question.
Mr. Stassen then read the following memorandum:
'Memorandum to U.S. Delegates and Advisors'
On the basis of suggestions and discussions these past few
days with a number of our delegates and advisors it
appears to me that the following would be the best answer
to our regional problems and it would at the same time
meet other problems ....
VI-E Self-Defense
1. Nothing in this Charter shall be construed as abrogating
the inherent right of self-defense against a violator of this
74
Charter ....
By 2:30 p.m. the next afternoon, a new draft article was presented
for discussion at the United States delegation meeting.1 75 The draft to be
added was a new paragraph 12 to Chapter VIII, Section B. It provided:
In the event of an attack by any state against any member
state, such member possesses the right to take measures of
self-defense. The right to take measures of self-defense
against armed attack shall apply to arrangements, like
those embodied in the Act of Chapultepec, under which all
members of a group of states agree to consider an attack
against any one of them as an attack against all of them.
The taking of such measures shall not affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council under this
Charter to take at any time such action as it may deem
necessary in order to maintain or restore international
peace and security.",
During discussion on that draft within the United States delegation,
Senator Connally asked whether the Security Council could take
cognizance of a situation in which there had been an attack followed by a
counterattack by other states acting in self-defense. After receiving an
affirmative answer, Mr. Dulles noted that states were, however, not
174. Id. at 658-60.
175. Id. at 663-64.

176. Id. at 664, 674.
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obligated to discontinue their countermeasures taken in self-defense.
Rather, there was "concurrent power."'"
Senator Vandenberg pointed out a bit of potential confusion with
the use of and distinction between the term attack in the first sentence and
the term armed attack in the second. Mr. Dulles explained it was done
deliberately to maintain consistency with the usage of the Monroe Doctrine
which covers two situations, overt attack and "political efforts from
outside the continent to effect the overthrow of the political institutions of
178
the American Republics."
A drafting change was suggested by Mr. Pasvolsky (State
Department) to insert the word inherent before the phrase right to selfdefense.'7'9 Additionally, the words "be reported immediately to the
Security Council" and "shall not in any way" were to be added before the
phrase "affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council."1lw
According to Senator Connally, "it was clear that this addition did not
mean that the attacked states should stop fighting before the necessary
countermeasures were taken by the world organization. ""'
The British and French objected to the draft as written. The
United States delegation worked out a compromise reflecting an earlier
French draft that hinged unilateral action upon the lack of a decision by the
Security Council.1 2 That draft read:
[s]hould the Security Council not succeed in preventing
aggression, and should aggression occur by any state
against any member state, such member state possesses the
inherent right to take necessary measures for self-defense.
The right to take such measures for self-defense against
armed attack shall also apply to understandings or
arrangements like those embodied in the Act of
Chapultepec, under which all members of a group of states
agree to consider an attack against any one of them as an
attack against all of them. The taking of such measures
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility

177. Id. at 666.
178. Id. at 677.
179. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 670. The word was added
without any apparent debate on the connotation, intent, meaning, or implication of the insertion.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 683. See also supra note 172.
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of the Security Council under this charter to take at any

time such action as it may deem necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.

83

When this draft was presented at the third Five-Power Informal
Consultative Meeting on May 12, 1945, the British reacted very
unfavorably.'1 Representatives of the United Kingdom and the United
States met to attempt to resolve differences. In the course of that effort,
Mr. Dulles noted that "the United States proposal attempted to define
aggression in terms of 'armed attack' and in this way it was hoped to avoid
the problem of trying to define aggression as such."1 85 In reply, Sir
Alexander Cadogen repeated his belief that "the Security Council should
have the opportunity to determine the circumstances of an armed attack
without trying to write any such close definition into the provisions. "186
183. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 834. Nowhere in the
discussion of the United States delegation was there any particular attention paid to the use of and
any necessary distinctions to be made between the terms aggression, armed attack, or attack even
though all three were included in the draft. One intriguing question that went unanswered was
that of Mr. Bloom who inquired whether the intent was to include the threat of aggression or
merely actual aggression. Id. at 679.
184. Id. at 691-98. Mr. Eden's challenge was not on the question of what armed attack
meant, but his fear of regionalism impairing the effectiveness of an international organization.
Id. at 695-96. In expressing his intense dislike, Eden did note that no one had been able to define
aggression in 30 years. Id. at 692. The only discussion of armed attack arose when Mr. Stassen,
explaining sentence two of the draft, said "the right of collective or group action comes into
operation in the event of an armed attack." Within the context, the obvious implication is an
effort to clarify that armed force was to be available to confront armed not unarmed force.
To Eden's protestations that the proposal empowered regional organization action outside
the sway of the Security Council, Senator Connally noted:
The United States proposal was not greatly at variance with the Anglo-Soviet and the
Franco-Soviet treaties. Under these treaties, as in the case of the Act of Chapultepec,
an attack against one is treated as an attack against all parties to the agreement. In both
cases the treaties were aimed at resistance to armed aggression. The United States
draft enlarges the scope but not the principle of the exception already agreed upon with
respect to Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2.
Id. at 694.
Stassen went on to note:
[The] United States draft would not give the regional organization freedom of action.
It was not as broad as . . . Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2 [directed against the
renewal of aggression by the enemy states]. Under that formula the parties to the
treaties could take enforcement action against enemy states. Under the United States'
draft there is no right of enforcement. There is only the right of action in self-defense
against armed attack.
Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 695.
185. Id. at 700.
186. Id.
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According to Dulles, it was not merely a question of an option for
Security Council action, rather it was a question of:
[T]he United States carrying forward within the world
organization its traditional policy of the Monroe Doctrine
as expanded and further defined in modern times; that the
Unites States now regards an attack on any of the
American Republic as an attack upon the United States and
in that event, the United States wished to exercise
7
collectively, its right to self-defense. 1
An alternate text was agreed upon and subsequently presented to the Five
Powers at another informal consultative meeting.' It read:
nothing in this Charter impairs the inherent right of selfdefense, either individual or collective, in the event that
the Security Council has failed to maintain international
peace and security and an armed attack against a member
state has occurred. Measures taken in the exercise of this
right shall be immediately reported to the Security Council
and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under this charter to
take at any time such action as it may deem necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and
security. ,19
Initially, all but the British seemed generally comfortable with the
proposal. Mr. Eden subsequently accepted the draft as it appears in the
main text. Ambassador Gromyko indicated this draft came closer to his
understanding of the principles and purposes of the organization, but
additional time to study it was necessary. The Chinese Ambassador (Koo),
reacted favorably, noting "out of this draft . . . we might be able to get
something ... acceptable." Mr. Bidault, the French representative, noted
"the draft said something that was self-evident. In case of aggression any
state has the right of self-defense.'10

187. Id. The discussants recalled Eden's point that "self-defense in modem Europe was a
difficult term to define, and that attempts to specify in the Charter those conditions under which
such self-defensive measures could be taken would raise many difficult issues." Id. At 703.
188. Id. at 705-07.
189. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 705.
190. Id. at 706.
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On May 14, the matter was taken up with the chiefs of the
principal Latin American delegates.' 9' Discussion focused on the apparent
deletion of any reference to the Act of Chapultepec in the proposed drafts.
None of the discussion related to the content of the inherent right nor to
the intended purpose or meaning of the term armed attack. Rather, it was
to assure the Latin American representatives that the Act of Chapultepec
and the regional organization would be viewed as consistent with the
Charter and, therefore, not subjected to prior approval by the Security
Council. '9
At the next Five Power Informal Consultative Meeting only one
minor change was made to proposed paragraph 12, the deletion of the
word fail in connection with Security Council action.' 9 The remainder of
the discussion dealt with other proposed changes concerning the operation
of the regional organizations themselves. 1'
At an executive session of the United States delegation held at
noon on Sunday, May 20, 1945, discussion turned to a new Russian draft
of paragraph 12.'19 It read:
[n]othing in this Charter impairs the inherent right of selfdefense, either individual or collective, if prior to
undertaking the measures for the maintenance of
international peace and security by the Security Council an
armed attack against a member state occurs. Measures
taken in the exercise of this right shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
191. Id. at 835.
192. Id. at 712-18. The attendees at that First Informal Consultative Meeting With
Chairman of Delegations of Certain American Republics, included the United States, Brazilian,
Chilean, Cuban, Colombian, Mexican, Peruvian, and Venezuelan delegations. This was the first
of three such informal consultative meetings with the Latin American diplomats held between
May 14-20, 1945. Id. at 712.
Their second meeting focused entirely on the questions concerning the Act of Chapultepec,
relating to a draft article under chapter VIII, section A, paragraph 3, not the provision relating to
self-defense which was denominated new paragraph 12, under chapter VIII, section B. Id. at
730-36.
193. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 737.
194. Id. at 737-39. Under discussion was the proposals on chapter VIII, section A,
paragraph 3, and section C. Id. The Russians were apparently concerned that collective action
could be taken on the basis of previous agreements. At the 44th meeting of the United States
delegation on May 17, 1945, Mr. Pasvolsky noted that to quell these concerns he "gave an
explanation of the Monroe Doctrine and the right of collective measures in defense." Id. at 778,
781-82.
195. Id. at 813-20.
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Council under this Charter to take at any time such action

as it may deem necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.1'9
Following additional discussion amongst members of the executive
group, a new draft was circulated.9 It read:
[niothing in this Charter impairs the inherent right of selfdefense, either individual or collective, if an armed attack
occurs against a member state before the Security Council
has taken adequate measures to maintain international

peace and security. Measures taken in the exercise of this
right shall be immediately reported to the Security Council

and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under this Charter to
take at any time such action as it may deem necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and
security. '"
Finally, a question was directed to the term armed attack.
Delegate Hackworth expressed the view that the draft greatly qualified the
right of self-defense by limiting it to the occasion of an armed attack. Mr.
Stassen replied that "this was intentional . . . we did not want. exercised
the right of self-defense before an armed attack had occurred."'"

196. Id. at 813.
197. See Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 824..
198. Id. at 817.
199. Id. at 818. This comment was made in an executive session of the United States
delegation. Even assuming that the clear intent was to limit any armed response until after a first
strike, there is no reflection that this view was shared with and by any other state delegation.
Debate in the Subcommittee and Committee on this draft, which was ultimately approved and
included in the Charter, reflects no discussion on this question. Such a non-event can hardly
support the proposition that inclusion of the term constituted a new norm inserted with the intent
to create a new regime.
It still remains questionable whether Stassen's comment was not intended to differentiate
between an attack as referenced under the Monroe Doctrine and Act of Chapultepec. This could
well contemplate non-military attacks from military (armed) attacks rather than confining selfdefense to an armed response to a first strike which would, effectively, repudiate the pre-existing
regime under the Caroline Doctrine. To the contrary, the interchangeable reference to armed
attack and aggression in the Subcommittee and Committee discussions as well as the use of
aggression arnee in the equally authoritative French version of the Charter, strongly evidence a
focus on armed force in contradistinction to non-armed force rather than a first strike regime.
That no such new bright line test was intended is supported by the decision not to include a
definition of aggression in the Charter itself and the 50 year struggle to arrive at a definition of
aggression. For additional comments see STONE, supra note 72, at 72-73.
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In response to another question by the Subcommittee of Five, a
slightly modified draft was produced. At 6:00 p.m. that evening, it was
presented at the seventh Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting on
Proposed Amendments.m As then formulated, the proposal read:
[n]othing in this Charter impairs the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack
occurs against a member state, until the Security Council
has taken the measures necessary to maintain (or restore)
international peace and security. Measures taken in the
exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security
Council under this Charter to take at any time such action
as it may deem necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.20'
Subsequent discussion by the Five Powers reflected no discussion on the
term armed attack.
At 9:00 p.m. the next evening, this proposal was presented to the
"The Latin American
Ambassadors of Certain American Republics.m
Ambassadors expressed enthusiastic support for these drafts and indicated
their appreciation of the efforts made by the United States delegation in
reaching these agreements. No dissent from the drafts was expressed."20 3
As discussed above, the record of discussion and passage in the
subcommittee or committee reflected no changes to this draft prior to
approval.2
From this record is there evidence that a new norm was intended
or had emerged? Specifically, does it appear to have been the widespread
understanding and intent that inclusion of the term armed attack in the
Charter was to effect a limitation or modification of the pre-existent norm
of self-defense by rendering impermissible an armed response until a state
had suffered a first strike?

200. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 818, 823-26. The reasons
for the modification concern use of the words "maintain or restore international peace and
security."
201. Id. at 823-24.
202. Id. at 825-26.
203. Id. at 826.
204. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 42-47.

Kahgan

1997]

Hardly. The record of proceedings in Subcommittee III/4/A and
Committee 4 clearly reflect no evident intent to do that," ' In fact,
throughout the discussion on article 51, in which armed attack is
mentioned, the delegates use of the term attack, armed attack, and
aggression interchangeably.2
The traditional self-defense right continues to exist outside what
may be a more restrictive standard under the Charter and contemplates
more than a response to a first strike appears recognized by the I.C.J. in
its Nicaragua decision.n7 As noted by Schachter, "in my view it is not
clear that article 51 was intended to eliminate the customary law right of
self-defense and should not be given the effect. "m
As there has been little apparent effective change in the states'
unilateral recourse to force, it would appear to be problematic to assume
that state practice manifests widespread recognition and acceptance of such
a normative change, reducing the sphere within which they can act in
armed self-defense.
The change has been more linguistic than
substantive.210
If anything, the failure of the anticipated collective machinery
envisioned in the United Nations system and the evolving practice of
member state authorizations has reinforced the import and necessity of
individual and collective self-defense.2 1 As Dinstein suggests,
[a]s long as the Charter's scheme of collective security
fails to function adequately, states are left to their own
devices when confronted with an unlawful use of force.
Again and again, they invoke the right of (individual or
205. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 826. There was, however,
one statement by Mr. Stassen to Mr. Bloom, another United States delegate, during an executive
session, stating that it was the intent to have armed attack restricted to an attack that had
occurred. Assuming for the moment that it meant to eliminate the traditional content of selfdefense, which does not require the completion of a first strike, rather than narrowing the broad
sway of the Monroe Doctrine and the attack language of the Act of Chapultepec which could be
understood to contemplate unarmed as well as armed attack. The absence of any record of
multilateral discussion and agreement that such a restricted meaning of armed attack should
hardly support the notion of widespread understanding and acceptance that the term was intended
to limit self-defense.
206. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 44-47.

207. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 134, paras. 175-90, 193-94 (June 27). See also supra note 58.
208. Oscar Schacter, InternationalLaw: The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH.
L. REV. 1620, 1634 (1984).
209. DINSTEIN, supra note 21, at 310.

210. Id.
211. Id.
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collective) self-defense in response to an armed attack.
Thus, instead of being a provisional interlude pending the
exercise of collective security, self-defense . . . has
virtually taken the place of collective security. The very
'centre of gravity in the United Nations has swung from
article 39 to article 51.'212
Schacter, too, notes: "[w]e are bound to conclude that the
collective security system of the United Nations Charter has now been
largely replaced by the fragmented collective defense actions and alliances

founded on article 51. "213
VII. What is the Relationship Between a State's Inherent Right of
Self-Defense and Security Council Action?
What was the intended relationship between the authority of states
to engage in armed self-defense and the authority of the Security Council
to undertake measures in the case of such occurrences?
The Charter scheme for this interplay reflects and confirms the jus
cogens status of the regime. This result obtains as the Charter clearly
reflects that the exercise of this right is immune from derogation or
interference by the Security Council. The focus here is on that portion of
article 51 whereby a state's inherent right to self-defense continues "until
the Security Council takes measures necessary to maintain international

peace and security. "214
That a state's right to engage in self-defense is not dependent upon
the action or inaction of the Security Council is clear from an examination
of the evolution of article 51. No consideration of this question appears in
the reported subcommittee or committee discussions on article 51
published in the multi-volume UNCIO report.2 1 However, as with the
other aspects of article 51, there was discussion of this question by the
Five Powers prior to the finalization of article 51 in the form in which it

212. Id.
213. Schachter, supra note 209, at 1639.
214. There is a second component to Security Council authority in article 51 which reads:
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence . . . shall not
in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the
present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
As discussed below, this applies concurrently with, not instead of, the exercise of self-defense.
215. See generallysupra notes 42-47 and 147.
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was submitted to and unanimously approved by Subcommittee 111/4/A and
2

Committee 4.16
A Russian draft, examined in an executive session of the United
States delegation on May 20, 1945, was understood to preclude
interference with a state's exercise of self-defense "during the period
elapsing between the attack and the time the Security Council takes
217
adequate measures to restore international peace and security."
A question arose amongst the Committee of five whether the
phrase maintain or restore and maintain international peace and security
was more appropriate, given that an attack constituted a breach of the
peace.218 During discussion, the view was expressed and agreed upon that
the right of self-defense continued until such time as the Security Council
took effective action. 19 That discussion, resulted in the production of the
draft presented at the seventh Five-Power Informal Consultative Meeting
on Proposed Amendments. 0
Discussion on this draft by the five delegations focused on only
one issue: whether to include the term restore. The British urged
retention of the term to reflect that the right of self-defense should continue
during the period of restoration as well as up to the point at which the
Security Council was taking action to restore the peace.2' The United
States accepted the elimination of the term although it was quite willing to
have it retained.2n The Soviet delegation thought the term maintain
To this Lord
encompassed the term restore rendering it unnecessary.
Halifax replied, "you can't maintain what isn't there."22 The Chinese
delegation preferred retaining the term.- Ultimately, the British ceded
their concern in the interests of not splitting the delegation, although it was

216. As indicated above, the drafting of article 51 was effected by the Five Powers in
consultation with representatives of some Latin American Republics. Once the language was
agreed upon, the article which was submitted for consideration by the subcommittee and
committee, was approved without amendment or modification. See generally supra notes 47-59.
Consequently, this drafting history is especially illuminating and relevant.
217. Id. at 816-17.
218. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 818.
219. Id. at 817.
220. Id. at 823-26.
221. Id. at 824.

222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 824.
225. Id.
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more logical to retain the term. 2 6 All agreed to the term maintain. The
plan was for the text to go to Committee the next day without the term
restore.*28 The Soviet Government was to be informed of the three to five
agreement on the utility of including the term. 9 However, if the Soviet
government did not agree on its inclusion, Lord Halifax would not press
the issue. 2" No discussion is reflected at that meeting on the term armed
attack.
There was no discord, question or comment made on this language
by the ambassadors of the American Republics or the members of the
Subcommittee and Committee who reviewed it prior to its unanimous
23
approval. '
The travaux, then, confirm the place for unilateral armed selfdefense within the Charter system; the right was to remain unimpaired
during the restoration phase. There are no contrary or countervailing
indications in the reported discussions of the subcommittee or committee
that even suggested any other intent or interpretation.
The structure intended under article 51 contemplated two
responses in the event of an armed conflict between states. The Security
Council is empowered to take any measures against the aggressor state(s)
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Simultaneously, the victim state retains its right to engage in armed force
for self-defense. 2 Presumably, had the United Nations available to it the
intended police force, the actions of the victim state in self-defense and the
United Nations in collective security would be consistent, complementary,
and co-existent.
The drafting history reflects the clear de-linkage between selfdefense and actions by the Security Council. " To avoid the suggestion
that the Security Council remained completely disempowered to act while
a state was engaged in armed self-defense, the second sentence of article
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Foreign Relations of the United States, supra note 159, at 824.
231. See generally supra notes 42-47, 57, 59-60, 190.
232. This obviously puts the obligation upon the Security Council to make a determination
of aggression and responsibility. That it may refuse or be unable to do so, given the veto system
and the political dynamic, was the impetus for the concern of the Latin American states that
found eventual resolution through explicit reservation of the right to self-defense. See supra
notes 51-52.
233. See supra notes 57-58, 172. concerning the French proposal and other drafts pegging
unilateral action to Security Council inaction. All these were jettisoned in the drafting process.
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51 was added.2 14 Clearly, the Security Council must remain fully
empowered to act against an aggressor.
The second phase would begin once peace had been restored,
when the focus would shift to its maintenance. At that point, there would
no longer be any necessity for self-defense. Unilateral armed efforts in
self-defense would not be permissible and would be subject to Security
Council mandate as there would be no existent threat or use of force.
Reflecting on the relationship between a state's self-defensive
rights and the legitimacy, propriety, and authority of Security Council
action, Dinstein, notes:
[t]he modes of action open to the Council are manifold.
Inter alia, the Council can . . .insist on the cessation of
the unilateral action of the defending state, supplanting it
with measures of collective security ...or ...decide that
the state engaged in a so-called self-defense is in reality the
aggressor. rn
Eugene Rostow states the situation even more explicitly:
[w]hat the Charter prescribes . . . [is] that the aggrieved
state and its friends and allies may decide for themselves
when to exercise their rights of individual and collective
defense until peace is restored or the Security Council, by
its own affirmative vote, decides that self-defense has gone
23 6
too far and has become a threat to the peace.
VIII. What are the Implications for Enforcement Actions Imposed by
the Security Council?
Effectuating the Charter goal of preventing international armed
conflict was not, then, to have been at the expense of a state's pre-existent

234. SCHOCHTER, supra note 214.
235. Emphasis added.

DINSTEIN, supra note 21, at 207.

The absence of such collective

security capability would obviously eliminate the basis for such interference by the Security
Council in the unilateral action by the defending state. Theoretically, the Security Council could
announce a multilateral cease-fire. If enforceable and enforced to end hostilities between
opposing states, this would not necessarily interfere with self-defense.

236. Eugene V. Rostow, The Gulf Crisis in InternationalLaw and Foreign Relations Law,
Continued: Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defense, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 506,

510 (1991). In support of his thesis, Rostow refers to D.W. Bowett's rejection of the view that
Security Council consideration of a conflict can effectively be deemed to suspend the injured
party's rights of self-defense. Rather, for Bowett, the aggrieved state may act even in conflict
with the Security Council. Id. at 511.
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right to engage in armed self-defense. No interference with a state's
inherent right to defend itself was intended because Security Council action
is not authorized until there is a peace to be maintained.
What implications does this regime have upon the authority of the
Security Council to undertake binding measures against states engaged in
armed self-defense? Is the Security Council empowered to undertake any
measures it deems appropriate in efforts to resolve an ongoing armed
conflict? Dinstein suggests:
[a]pparently it is not enough (under article 51) for the
Security Council to adopt just any resolution, in order to
divest member states of the right to continue to resort to
force in self-defense against an armed attack. The only
resolution that will engender that result is a legally binding
decision, whereby the cessation of the (real or imagined)
defensive action becomes imperative. Short of such a
measure, the member state engaged in self-defense is not
obligated to desist from the use of force. However, the
defending state still acts at its own risk, perhaps more so
than before.
Continued hostilities may precipitate a
decision by the Council against a self proclaimed victim of
an armed attack. 37
This author suggests that if such action interferes with a state's
inherent right of armed self-defense, it implicates jus cogens.
Consequently, not even the Security Council can institute measures that
238
prevent a state from availing itself of that right as the state sees fit.
The strictures of jus cogens and its effect is not limited solely to
conflict between a peremptory norm and the prohibition or invalidation of
a treaty. 3 9 Rather, as clearly expressed by the ILC in its 1966
commentary: "a rule of jus cogens is an overriding rule depriving any act

237. DINSTEIN, supra note 21, at 208-09. The earlier version of his book had the following
as the concluding portion of that sentence: "[That a breach of international peace has been
committed, thus laying the ground for the introduction of enforcement action." Id. at 196-97.
For the one qualification, imperative, Dinstein cites to C.H.M.Waldock, The Regulation of
the Use of Force by Individual States in InternationalLaw, 81 R.C.C.D.I. 451, 495-96 (1952).

238. A state's unilateral decision to engage in self-defense remains, however, subject to
review by the international community through, for example, the political or legal branches of the
United Nations organization and application of the traditional requirements: necessity and
proportionality.
239. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 6.
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or situation which is in conflict with it of legality. "m The effect of a jus
cogens violation extends to acts and renders them unlawful .14 The
outcome of a jus cogens regime, then, is the comprehensive
prohibition of
22
all acts contrary to the peremptory norm implicated.

4

Additionally, pertinent evidence exists in state practice,
international jurisprudence and doctrine that the prohibition of derogation
which is a component of the article 53 definition of jus cogens, is to be
understood to prohibit any acts conflicting with a given norm. 23
The clear import of the preceding analysis is to suggest that
binding measures imposed by the Security Council that interfere with a
victim state's inherent right to engage in armed self-defense, even if such
are equally imposed upon the aggressor state, violates jus cogens. Such
measures are nullities which no state can be compelled to comply with,
without itself engaging in an agreement and acts that violate the most
widely recognized and fundamental peremptory norm for the maintenance
of world order."
To the extent that this inherent right of self-defense is a
peremptory norm, not even the Security Council can institute mandatory
measures such as an arms embargo, imposed on all the reputed parties to
an ongoing armed conflict, as such effectively undermines the ability of a
240. Emphasis added. Int'l L. Comm'n Report, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1, p. 89 (1966).
This comment was made in connection with draft article 61, which became article 64 in the final
text (conflict with newly emerging norms).
241. Id.
242. Id. The logic is clear. Without this expansive coverage, peremptory norms would be
rendered meaningless as states need only avoid including problematic provisions in treaty form to
remain empowered to act in derogation of jus cogens. Id. Allowing such an end run around jus
cogens would undermine the fundamental policy for such norms: ensuring that certain norms,
considered essential for world public order, that protect vital interests and values of the
international community of states, not merely the interests of some, remain inviolate.
HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4.
243. HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 7. He notes that this interpretation is consistent with
the presumed purpose of international jus cogens: to protect the international community from all
acts contrary to peremptory norms. id.
Because peremptory norms protect overriding interests and values of the international
community, states owe peremptory obligations to that community not to individual states. One
such obligation erga omnes, in the protection of which all states can be held to have a legal
interest, as such is necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security, is the
prohibition of the use of aggressive force between states. Barcelona Traction, supra note 58, at
32. See also HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at 5.

244. Even were there evidence in the Charter travaux that states intended to surrender their
otherwise more extensive rights to engage in self-defense to the international organization,
anticipating a global police force to confront aggression in their stead, the failure of the bargain
or arrangement to have occurred would render such self-defensive entitlements necessary.
STONE, supra note 72, at 96, 100-01.
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victim state to engage in self-defense and, thereby, prevents a state from
availing itself of that right. While any state remains free to choose not to
supply arms, a mandatory prohibition violates jus cogens.
While some may suggest that this implicates a regime whereby the
use of force is unrestrained and, therefore, antithetical to the intended
United Nations Charter regime, that is not quite the scenario. Other legal
requirements still remain relevant. For example, states remain obligated to
pursue pacific settlement before using force, to support the claimed
necessity for engaging in self-defense and comply with Charter
obligations. 5
Ultimately, if the determination is made that a state,
claiming to be acting in self-defense is found not to be by the Security
Council, it remains empowered to call such continuing actions threats to
the peace or aggression and institute enforcement measures accordingly.
These same options exist if a state's reputed self-defensive measures fail to
comply with the customary restrictions in that they are neither necessary or
proportionate.24 In the final analysis, recognition of the peremptory status
of a states right to engage in armed self-defense does not signal the end of
the Charter system for the regulation of the interstate use of armed force.
Rather, recognition of the status which self-defense was to hold from the
outset, merely returns to the original framework.
That the envisioned Security Council force has not come to pass,
necessitates recognition that unilateral self-defense remains essential to
confront the threat to world welfare posed by armed aggressors. This
social concern in preventing and confronting aggression is the final
justification to confirm the jus cogens status of the traditional self-defense
regime. Given the incapacity of the United Nations to field its multilateral
force, the only remaining option is that of a state victim, and others
responding to its call, to confront that armed aggression by armed force.
The use of force regime proposed herein, which includes the right
to engage in armed self-defense, protects an overriding interest or value in
the international community of states. That community would be seriously
jeopardized by derogation therefrom. Rather than producing any negative
evidence, this regime remains, however regrettable, affirmatively

245. While it must be noted that pacific measures can not be imposed in derogation of a
state's jus cogens entitlement to use self-defense, whether or not recourse has been had thereto
may be highly relevant to a determination that such self-defensive measures were not necessary,
246. While a sanction, such as an arms embargo might be imposed at this juncture, that
does not legitimize doing so earlier, while a victim state is engaged in self-defense. As
demonstrated by the Nicaragua litigation, the I.C.J. may have a place in this regulatory process
as well.
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necessary. Consequently, the peremptory status of the norm may be
presumed.241

247. This is the fifth criteria suggested by Hannikainen.
12-13.

HANNIKAINEN, supra note 4, at

